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RULES 58 AND 79(A) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND THE
SEPARATE JUDGMENT AND DOCKET
ENTRY REQUIREMENTS
MICHAEL ZACHARY*

This article addresses two issues of federal appellate jurisdiction:
whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal (a) where the
district court failed to file a separate judgment after rendering a final
decision, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, and the
appellant's notice of appeal from that decision is not filed within the time
period set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1); or (b)
where the district court failed to enter the final judgment in the civil
docket, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a), although the
appellant filed a notice of appeal from the final decision.
These issues are of some importance to both appellants and the federal
courts as the described omissions may result in unnecessary confusion,
inefficient marshalling of judicial resources, and, most important, delays
in obtaining or, possibly, actual loss of the right to, appellate review.
While it cannot be said that these omissions occur on a daily basis, their
regularity, the mischief they may cause, and the inconsistent treatment
they have received by the courts and commentators, suggest that a clear
and cogent resolution is needed. It is hoped that the following discussion
will be of some use to the courts in reaching that resolution.
I. THE SEPARATE DOCUMENT REQUIREMENT
AND THE WAIVER DOCTRINE

Although the district courts are generally required, under Civil
Procedure Rule 58,2 to file a judgment as a separate document at the
* Supervisory Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
policies of the Second Circuit.

1. Throughout this article, once a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or a Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure is introduced, it will thereafter be abbreviated as "Civil
" or "Appellate Procedure Rule __."
Procedure Rule
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 58, entitled "Entry of Judgment," states as follows:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): (1) upon a general verdict of a jury,
or upon a decision by the court that a party shall recover only a sum certain
or costs or that all relief shall be denied, the clerk, unless the court otherwise
orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign and enter the judgment without awaiting

any direction by the court; (2) upon a decision by the court granting other
relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers
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conclusion of an action, this requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite
for an appeal and may be waived by the parties.' This waiver rule,
announced in Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis,4 resolved an inter-circuit
conflict5 concerning appellate jurisdiction: those circuit courts which

found a separate judgment to be a jurisdictional prerequisite dismissed

appeals in which separate judgments were lacking; 6 those courts which

found that the filing of a separate judgment after the rendering of a final
decision could be, and in fact had been, waived by the parties found
jurisdiction and reviewed the merits of the appeal.'
In Mallis, the
Supreme Court agreed with the latter courts of appeals, but emphasized
that both the finality of the order under appeal and the waiver of the
separate judgment requirement must be clear.'
to interrogatories, the court shall promptly approve the form of the judgment,
and the clerk shall thereupon enter it. Every judgment shall be setforth on a
separatedocument. A judgment is effective only when so setforth and when
entered asprovidedin Rule 79(a). Entry of the judgment shall not be delayed,
nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees, except
that, when a timely motion for attorneys' fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2), the
court, before a notice of appeal has been filed and has become effective, may
order that the motion have the same effect under Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure as a timely motion under Rule 59. Attorneys
shall not submit forms of judgment except upon direction of the court, and
these directions shall not be given as a matter of course.
Id. (emphasis added). The requirement that every judgment be set forth on a separate
document was added in 1963. See FED. R. CIv. P. 58 advisory committee note to 1963
amendment.
3. See Deborah F. Harris, Annotation, Requirement of Rule 58, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,That Every Judgment Shall Be Set Forth on a Separate Document, 53
A.L.R. FED. 595 (1981 Supp. 1994).
4. 435 U.S. 381, 384-88 (1978).
5. Id. at 382-83 & n.2 (noting conflict and listing cases).
6. See, e.g., Sassoon v. United States, 549 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1977); Baker v.
South Pac. Transp., 542 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1976); Baity v. Ciccone, 507 F.2d 717 (8th
Cir. 1974); Richland Trust Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1973);
Lyons v. Davoren, 402 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Mallis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824, 827 n.4 (2d Cir.
1977) af'd in part, dismissed in part sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S.
381 (1978); W.G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498, 501 n.4
(4th Cir. 1973).
8. Mallis, 435 U.S. at 387-88; see Turnerv. Air Transp. Lodge 1894 of Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 585 F.2d 1180, 1182 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979) (acknowledging waiver rule, but remanding because
district court order under appeal was unclear as to (i) whether it was a final decision and
(ii) the relief granted).
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Waiver, or consent to the appeal without the filing of a separate
judgment document, is generally established where one party appeals from

an order and the opposing parties do not contest the appeal on the basis
of the separate document rule. 9 It can be assumed that, where the

absence of a separate judgment is the only defect, objections by appellees
on the basis of the separate judgment rule will be rare since the appeal
will go forward in any event after the separate judgment is filed and
entered. Since the only likely advantage to an appellee who insists on the
filing of a separate judgment will be that which is gained through delay of
the appellate process, the courts may wish to examine the motives of any

appellee so objecting. If it appears that an objection is not made in good
faith, but only for the purpose of delay or harassment or for other

improper purposes, the court may deem it appropriate to consider the
separate judgment requirement waived, notwithstanding the appellee's

vexatious objection.' 0

II. WHERE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT FILED AFTER THE
DISTRICT COURT'S FINAL DECISION WITHIN THE TIME
PERIOD SET FORTH IN APPELLATE PROCEDURE RULE
4(A)(1), AND No SEPARATE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED
The classic Mallis situation is one in which the district court failed to file
a separate judgment document, but the appellant's notice of appeal from
the district court's final decision was timely filed within the parameters of
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1)." In that instance the only issue to be
decided is whether waiver occurred. A more difficult situation arises
where there is no separate judgment document and the notice of appeal is
not filed after the final decision within the time period set forth in
9. Mallis, 435 U.S. at 387-88; see, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d
259, 263 n.1 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994); Cooper v. Salomon
Bros., 1 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 737 (1994); Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven, 889 F.2d 428, 430-31 (2d Cir. 1989).
10. Although the Supreme Court stated in Mallis that the separate judgment
requirement "must be 'mechanically applied[,]'" absent waiver by the parties, it did not
foreclose other exceptions to that requirement. Mallis, 435 U.S. at 386 (quoting United
States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1973)). A litigant's improper motive for
performing acts otherwise permitted by the federal rules of procedure has long provided
a basis for forbidding the taking of such action or for punishing the litigant afterwards.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927; FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) & (c), 16(f), 26(g)(2) & (3), 56(g);
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) (stating that federal courts have
inherent authority to assess attorneys' fees to sanction a party who "act[s] in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons" (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)).
11. FED. R. APp. P. 4(a)(1).
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Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1). As yet, neither the courts nor
commentators have provided a satisfactory resolution or analysis as to (a)
whether the timing of such a notice of appeal deprives the court of appeals

of appellate jurisdiction, or (b) where it is recognized that such an

"untimely" notice of appeal is not a bar to appellate jurisdiction, whether
the court of appeals must stay or dismiss the appeal and require the parties
to return to the district court for filing and entry of a separate judgment

by that court.
Resolution of these two issues appears to lie in the interstices between (a)
Appellate Procedure Rule (4)(a)(2),12 which deems as timely a notice of
appeal filed prior to entry of judgment, (b) the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Indrelunas,3 which requires the separate document

requirement to be "mechanically applied in order to avoid new
uncertainties as to the date on which a judgment is entered[,]"14 and (c)
the Supreme Court's Mallis decision. 5 However, these three authorities
do not clearly dispose of the issues outlined above since they involve
situations which are distinguishable: Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2)
assumes that a separate judgment was, in fact, filed and entered at some
point; Indrelunas involved a separate judgment which was belatedly
entered by the district court and a subsequently filed notice of appeal

which was found effective through the Supreme Court's holding that the
separate judgment requirement must be mechanically applied; 6 and,
12. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2) provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed after the court
announces a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order is treated as
filed on the date of and after the entry."
13. 411 U.S. 216 (1973).
14. Id. at 222.
15. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381.
16. In Indrelunas,a jury verdict regarding liability only was rendered on March 21,
1969. On the same day, the verdict was entered in the docket pursuant to the judge's
instruction that "the verdicts be entered.., and ... there be judgment on the verdicts
so entered." Foiles v. United States, 465 F.2d 163, 164-65 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 (1973). A stipulation regarding the
amounts to be paid to the prevailing parties was filed on May 14, 1970 and the appellant,
the government, filed a timely notice of appeal. That appeal, however, was not pursued.
On February 25, 1971, on the government's motion, the district court entered formal
judgments from which the government appealed. The court of appeals, in holding that
the government's appeal was untimely, decided that judgment had been entered on March
21, 1969 and that a separate judgment document was required only when a complex
judgment, as described in clause (2) of Civil Procedure Rule 58, was rendered. Foiles,
465 F.2d at 166-69; Indrelunas, 411 U.S. at 219. The Supreme Court reversed, finding
that a separate judgment document was required for both the "simple" and "complex"
judgments described in Rule 58 and that a separate judgment was not filed until February
25, 1971. Id. at 220-22. The court also held that the intent or good faith of the
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while it was held in Mallis that the filing of a separate judgment may be

waived by the parties, 7 the timeliness of the notice of appeal was not at
issue.

8

As a result of the uncertainty concerning how these authorities

government was not a relevant consideration:
,V]hatever may be the appropriate sanctions available in a particular case
for capricious conduct on the part of a litigant, we do not believe that a caseby-case tailoring of the 'separate document' provision of Rule 58 is one of
them. That provision is, as Professor Moore states, a 'mechanical change'
that must be mechanically applied in order to avoid new uncertainties as to the
date on which a judgment is entered.
Id. at 221-22; accordDomegan v. Ponte, 972 F.2d 401, 405 (lst Cir. 1992), vacated on
other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1378 (1993). Thus, while Indrelunasstrengthened the separate
document requirement of Civil Procedure Rule 58, it did not concern the situation where
a notice of appeal is filed long after entry of a dispositive order and a separate judgment
is never filed.
17. Mallis, 435 U.S. at 384.
18. But see Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 891 n.3 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983). In Parisie,the court found that the timeliness of the notice
of appeal in Mallis was, in fact, an issue resolved by the Supreme Court sub silentio. Id.
However, this conclusion is based on an incorrect reading of the various filing and entry
dates in the Mallis case. The Parisiedecision states that the notice of appeal in Mallis
"was filed many months after the appealed from order . . . ." Id. However, this
conclusion was apparently based on the Second Circuit's inaccurate description in its
Mallis opinion of the procedural history of the case. After noting that the notice of
appeal was filed March 24, 1976, the Second Circuit stated that the district court's
opinion ordering dismissal of the complaint was filed September 30, 1975, and a Civil
Procedure Rule 54(b) certificate directing the entry of final judgment with respect to all
defendants but one was filed December 5, 1975. Mallis, 568 F.2d at 827 n.4.
According to the Second Circuit, it was the Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) certificate which
permitted the appeal. Id.
However, the Mallis district court docket sheet states otherwise. According to the
docket sheet, the case was dismissed as to all defendants by order entered on September
30, 1975; by order entered October 2, 1975, the claim against one defendant was
reinstated; the plaintiffs filed their first notice of appeal from the order of dismissal on
October 31, 1975 and, on November 25, 1975, filed motions for Civil Procedure Rule
54(b) certification and an extension of time to file a notice of appeal; by order filed
November 28, 1975, the district court denied certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
and, on December 15, 1975, denied certification under Civil Procedure Rule 54(b); a
copy of the court of appeals order indicating the withdrawal of the plaintiff's first appeal
was filed in district court on December 23, 1975; the claim against the one remaining
defendant was dismissed by an order and stipulation filed March 2, 1976; the second,
effective, notice of appeal was filed March 24, 1976.
Since the March 2, 1976 order dismissing the action as to the last defendant was the
final decision of the district court, the March 24, 1976 notice of appeal was filed after
the final decision within the period permitted by Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1),
notwithstanding the contrary suggestion in Parisie. See Beukema's Petroleum Co. v.
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interact with each other, the various courts facing the two issues discussed
here have resolved them in a variety of ways. Unfortunately, even those
courts which appear to have reached a correct resolution of the issues fail
to offer a satisfactory explanation for their decision. 9
Admiral Petroleum Co., 613 F.2d 626, 628 n.2 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting that "no question
as to the timeliness of the appeal was involved" in Mallis). It must be assumed that the
Supreme Court had access to the district court's docket sheet and record when it decided
the jurisdictional issue in Mallis. Thus, there was no reason for the Supreme Court to
determine whether the Mallis waiver doctrine would also apply where the notice of
appeal was not filed after the final order within the period allowed by Appellate
Procedure Rule 4(a)(1). But see Mallis, 435 U.S. at 382 n.1 & 384 n.4 (notes judgment
of dismissal was entered September 30, 1975; no mention of March 2, 1976 order). The
conclusion that timeliness was not an issue in Mallis is further supported by the Supreme
Court's explicit statement that "[tjhe issue posed is whether a decision of a district court
can be a 'final decision' for purposes of [28 U.S.C.] § 1291 if not set forth on a
document separate from the opinion." Id. at 383.
19. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the courts and the applicable
federal rules and statutes have given the phrase "entry of judgment" a variety of
meanings. In the strict Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) sense, it refers to the entering of
judgment as an item on the docket sheet. A broader definition is derived from Appellate
Procedure Rule 4(a)(7) which states that "[a] judgment or order is entered within the
meaning of this Rule 4(a) when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58 and 79(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The reference to Civil Procedure Rule 58 in
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(7) has been interpreted to mean that "entry" includes both
the mechanical procedures described in Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) and the rendering of
a separate judgment document. See, e.g., Allah v. Superior Court, 871 F.2d 887 (9th
Cir. 1989); Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1987); Caperton v. Beatrice
Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 688 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Shalala v. Schaefer,
113 S.Ct. 2625, 2632 n.6 (1993) (distinguishing between entry of judgment and entry
of a formal separate judgment). The genesis of Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(7),
previously Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(6), supports this interpretation. Prior to the
1979 amendment which resulted in the current version of the rule, the rule stated that
"[a] judgment or order is entered within the meaning of this subdivision when it is
entered in the civil docket." See FED. R. APP. P.4(a)(6) (1968); Prelim. Draft of
Proposed Amendments, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. of the Judicial Conf., Rule
4(a) (April 1977); see also Prelim. Draft of Proposed Uniform Rules of Fed. App. Proc.,
Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. of the Judicial Conf., Rule 4(a) (March 1964)
(sentence ends with "when it is noted in the civil docket"). The sentence was amended
in 1979 to "call attention to the requirement of Rule 58 of the F.R.C.P. that the
judgment constitute a separate document." Advisory Comm. Notes to 1979 Amendment,
Rule 4(a)(6). See generallyWalter W. Jones, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes "Entry
of Judgment" Within Meaning of Rule 58 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
Amended in 1963, 10 A.L.R. FED. 709 (1972 Supp. 1994); Comment Note, Annotation,
FormalRequirements of Judgment or Orderas RegardsAppealability, 73 A.L.R.2d 250
(1960). Some authorities also use the phrase in its broadest sense, as meaning to
formally set down the court's disposition in writing. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
530-31 (6th ed. 1990). This interpretation blurs the distinction between "rendition of
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A. The Case Law
1. Appellate Jurisdiction Found; No Remand Necessary

Of the nine circuits which have confronted the timeliness issues posed in
this section, seven (the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and

Tenth Circuits) have determined that such an appeal is not untimely and
may proceed without a remand.'

The seven circuits which permit the

appeal to proceed employed a two-step analysis. First, since Indrelunas
(or its progeny) and Civil Procedure Rule 58 require the entry of a
separate judgment document in all cases,2 and Appellate Procedure Rule
4(a) measures the time within which to file a notice of appeal from that

entry, a notice of appeal filed before entry of the separate judgment was
found not untimely even if filed long after the final disposition in the
action.'
Such an appeal was found to be premature, not late.23
Second, rather than require the parties to the appeal to return to the

district court to arrange for entry of the missing separate judgment, these
courts found, pursuant to Mallis, that the parties had waived such entry
and that the appeal could proceed without further delay. 4
judgment" and "entry of judgment" which is discussed in BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY
under "Entering Judgments." Id. at 531. For purposes of this article, the phrases "Civil
Procedure Rule 79 entry" (or "docket entry") and "Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a) entry"
will be used to indicate which of the first two definitions discussed above is intended.
The third, broadest definition will not be used.
20. Domegan v. Ponte, 972 F.2d 401, 406 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated on other
grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1378 (1993); Gregson & Assocs. Architects v. Virgin Islands, 675
F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 1982); Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683,
691 (4th Cir. 1978); Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462, 1468-69 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1080 (1990); Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 883, 890-91
(7th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918, 950 (1983); Vernon v. Heckler,
811 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1987); Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 186 (10th Cir.
1992).
21. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. at 221-22.
22. See supra note 20.
23. Id.
24. Domegan, 972 F.2d at 405-06; Caperton, 585 F.2d at 689-91; Reid, 886 F.2d
at 1468-69; Parisie, 705 F.2d at 890-91; Vernon, 811 F.2d at 1276-77. Although
Clough does not mention Indrelunas,its discussion of Civil Procedure Rule 58 is clearly
consistent with Indrelunas. Clough, 959 F.2d at 185-86. In Gregson, four paragraphs
after discussing the Mallis waiver doctrine, the court stated, "As discussed supra, the
lack of a separate document does not preclude us from recognizing the existence of an
appealable final judgment[ ]" and cited to Mallis as an example. 675 F.2d at 591-92,
593 n.5. In so doing, it is assumed that the court was applying the waiver doctrine.
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2. Appellate Jurisdiction Found; Remand Necessary
Although the Eighth Circuit has held that the absence of a separate

judgment prevents a belated notice of appeal from being found untimely
under Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1), it still requires the parties to such

an appeal to return to the district court for entry of a separate
judgment.' In In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.,26 the court held

that the lack of a separate judgment document prevented an appellant's
appeal from being time-barred z In so holding, the court adopted the

analysis of Judge Eschbach of the Seventh Circuit in Parisie v. Greer,8
which, in turn, was based on the holding in Indrelunas that the separate

document requirement must be "mechanically applied." 29 Although the
Eighth Circuit recognized that "'a court confronted with such a situation
may consider the technically premature appeal on the merits without the

necessity of a formalistic remand,'" 3" it decided that the "better
practice" 3 ' was to remand for entry of judgment on a separate document
without prejudice to the taking of a timely appeal upon entry of thatjudgment.

32

The Second Circuit position remains unclear. In In re Time Warner Inc. Sec.
Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994), after finding a
proper waiver of the separate judgment requirement under Mallis, the Court noted that
the notice of appeal was timely filed from the final decision in the case. Id. at 263 n.l.
Since the court was not faced with an "untimely" notice of appeal, there was no need for
it to decide whether the Mallis waiver doctrine resolved that issue as well.
25. In re Ozark Restaurant Equip., 761 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1985).
26. Id. at 481.
27. Id. at 484.
28. 705 F. 2d 882, 883, 890-91 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 464 U.S. 950
(1983).
29. Id. at 891 (stating that "Mallis reaffirmed the holding in Indrelunas that 'the
separate document rule must be "mechanically applied" in determining whether an appeal
is timely.' [Mallis, 435 U.S.] at 386.") (emphasis in Parisieopinion).
30. Ozark RestaurantEquip., 761 F.2d at 484 (quoting Parisie,705 F.2d at 890).
31. Id.
32. Id. The only authority cited in Ozark RestaurantEquip. in support of the use
of the "better practice" was Beukema's Petroleum Co. v Admiral Petroleum Co., 613
F.2d 626, 629 (6th Cir. 1979). The court in Beukema's Petroleum, which involved an
appeal from an injunction, found that while the Mallis waiver doctrine was "salutary
when the issue involves filing requirements for a timely appeal, the potential problems
which may stem from injunctive relief would seem to require greater efforts toward
compliance [with the separate judgment rule]." Id. at 628. The court concluded that
there was "no practical reason to ignore the lack of [Civil Procedure] Rule 58 formality
at this juncture of the proceedings, and the better practice calls for compliance in this
case even though the parties have treated the opinion as an appealable preliminary
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3. No Appellate Jurisdiction; New Appeal Allowed Only After Appellant
Moved for Entry of Separate Judgment
The Fifth Circuit also requires the parties to return to the district court in
such situations, although for somewhat different reasons than the Eighth
Circuit. In Townsend v. Lucas,33 the Fifth Circuit found that although
Mallis permitted the parties to waive entry of a separate judgment, waiver
in that case would leave the appellant with an untimely appeal from the
last order entered in the case, one which adopted a magistrate judge's

recommendation of dismissal with prejudice.'

In order to comply with

the statement inMallis that the separate document requirement "should be
interpreted to prevent loss of the right of appeal, not to facilitate loss," the
Fifth Circuit decided to "not view[] the [last order in the action] as a final
order" and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.35 The holding was
summarized as follows: "Since no final judgment has been entered as a

separate document and thus there is no timely notice of appeal, the
jurisdictional prerequisites for an appeal have not been met and the appeal
should be dismissed."36 The court advised that the "problem of the
untimely notice of appeal... [could] be obviated if [the appellant] file[d]

a motion for the entry of a judgment in the district court," from which he
could then appeal.37

injunction." Id. at 629. The case was remanded for entry of an injunction on a separate
document; the court of appeals retained jurisdiction of the appeal in all other respects
upon return of the case to that court after entry of the separate judgment. Id. Ozark
Restaurant Equip. involved an appeal from a bankruptcy judge's order awarding
judgment to a bankruptcy trustee in three adversary proceedings. Ozark Restaurant
Equip., 761 F.2d at 482. The opinion does not state whether injunctive relief was
involved.
33. 745 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1984).
34. Id. at 934.
35. Id.

36. Id. at 933-34.
37. Id. at 934. The Fifth Circuit also noted that it had previously held in United
States v. Rodriquez, 744 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1984) (reported in table only), that "it may
take jurisdiction over an appeal in which judgment has not been entered on a separate
document even when the notice of appeal from the noncomplying order is untimely." Id.
at 934 n. 1. Since this prior holding is inconsistent with the holding in Townsend, it is
assumed that its status as an unpublished table case renders it of limited precedential
value under the local rules of the Fifth Circuit.
The holding in Townsend was later described by the Fifth Circuit as follows:
"Under Townsend v. Lucas, this court may elect to dismiss an appeal in which no [Civil
Procedure] Rule 58 judgment has been entered, but is not required to do so. Generally,
this court declines under Townsend to hear the appeal if the status of a post-judgment
motion is unclear due to the lack of a [Civil Procedure] Rule 58 judgment or if the notice

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

4. No Appellate Jurisdiction; Appeal Forfeited
There are two circuit court opinions which conclude that appellate
jurisdiction is irreparably lost where an appellant files a notice of appeal
beyond the time period permitted by Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1),
even where a separate judgment has not been entered. Although neither
opinion represents the current law of their respective circuits, they appear
to reflect a strong minority view on this issue. The first is the four-judge
dissenting opinion in Parisie v. Greer,38 an en banc decision in which
five of the nine voting judges found, pursuant to Indrelunas and Mallis,
appellate jurisdiction without the necessity of a remand. The dissenters,
however, found that the Mallis waiver doctrine required a finding of no
appellate jurisdiction.39 They reasoned that since there was no doubt or
confusion that the district court's dispositive decision was the final order
in the case, and the judge and all parties treated it as such, and no party
objected to the absence of a separate judgment, the separate judgment
requirement was waived, leaving the appellant with an untimely appeal.'
Similar reasoning was used in Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heilig Oil & Gas,
Inc. ,41 an unpublished decision which, under the rules of the Sixth
Circuit, may not be cited except under limited circumstances. The court
in Amoco Oil, citing Mallis, found that the purpose of the separate
judgment requirement "is merely to identify the district court order as a
final decision and clarify when the appeals period began to run." 42 Since
the appellant was not misled by the failure to enter a separate judgment
and recognized the court's dispositive decision as the final order, "[tihe
mere technicality that the district court failed to file a separate judgment
should not be used to give jurisdiction to this Court of an untimely filed
of appeal would have been untimely if the order appealed had constituted a [Civil

Procedure] Rule 58 judgment." Whitaker v. Houston, 963 F.2d 831, 834 (5th Cir.
1992). While this statement in Whitaker makes the Townsend determination sound
discretionary, and thus nonjurisdictional, the Townsend decision clearly stated that
dismissal was required since "jurisdictional prerequisites for an appeal ha[d] not been met
... " Townsend, 745 F.2d at 933-34.
38. 705 F.2d 882, 883, 890-91 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 950
(1983).
39. Id. at 889.
40. Id. The dissenters also rejected the analysis of three other judges who found

jurisdiction on grounds other than the Indrelunasand Mallis decisions. Id. at 885-88.
41. 786 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 966 (1986).
42. Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heilig Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 85-1619, 1986 U.S. App.
LEXIS (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 966 (1986).
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appeal in which the parties were not misled by the lack of a separate
judgment."'43
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Amoco Oil,4 Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented from the denial and
opined that the Sixth Circuit had misconstrued the Supreme Court's
decisions in Indrelunas and Mallis.4 5 Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning, Justice Blackmun argued that Indrelunas and Mallis, in all
instances, should be construed to save appellate jurisdiction:
These two decisions, I believe, are to be read to support the
following proposition: the separate-document requirement must be
applied mechanically in order to protect a party's right of appeal,
although parties may waive this requirement in order to maintain
appellate jurisdiction of their case .. . Given that a finding of
waiver in this case results in Amoco's loss of its right of appeal,
then, under our earlier decisions in Indrelunas and Bankers Trust
[v. Mallis], [Civil Procedure] Rule 58 should have been applied
mechanically. The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the
purported appeal and directed the District Court to enter a final
judgment, from which a proper appeal could lie.'
The analysis of Justice Blackmun is similar to that of the Fifth Circuit in
Townsend v. Lucas.47 Both opinions recognize that waiver of the
separate document requirement would leave the appellant with an untimely
appeal;' 8 both conclude that dismissal of the appeal is necessary;49 and
both state that an appeal can be salvaged by arranging for the entry of a
separate judgment by the district court."0 The only distinction is that
Justices Blacknun and O'Connor would have the court of appeals order
43. Id.
44. Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heilig Oil & Gas, Inc., 479 U.S. 966 (1986) (denying
certiorari).
45. Id. at 966-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 969 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
47. 745 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1984).
48. Amoco Oil, 479 U.S. at 969 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Townsend, 745 F.2d
at 933-34.
49. Amoco Oil, 479 U.S. at 969 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Townsend, 745 F.2d
at 934.
50. Amoco Oil, 479 U.S. at 969 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Townsend, 745 F.2d
at 933-34.
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the district court to enter a separate judgment,5' while the Fifth Circuit
2
would require the appellant to move for entry of a separate judgment.1
In its first published opinion on the subject, the Sixth Circuit followed
neither the procedure followed in its prior unpublished opinion in Amoco
Oil nor that suggested by Justice Blackmun. Instead, in Reid v. White
Motor Corp.,' it followed the majority of circuit courts by finding
jurisdiction and considering the merits of the appeal without requiring the
appellant to return to the lower court for entry of a separate judgment.'
Entry of a separate judgment was deemed waived pursuant to Mallis.55
5.

No Appellate Jurisdiction and Appeal Forfeited Where Appellant
Failed to Appeal Within Three Months

Although the First Circuit, in Domegan v. Ponte,56 interpreted
Indrelunas and Mallis as allowing an appellate court, where the notice of
appeal was not timely filed as measured from the final decision, to
consider the merits of the appeal without requiring the appellant to return
to the district court for entry of a separate judgment, 57 it created a
notable exception in Fiore v. Washington County Community Mental
51. Amoco Oil, 479 U.S. 966 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

52. Townsend, 745 F.2d at 934. The procedure suggested by the Fifth Circuit
leaves open the possibility that the district court could decide not to enter a separate
judgment. See 15B CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 3915 at 262-63 (1992 Supp. 1994) (noting instances where district court refused to

enterjudgment). The district court may believe that a separate judgment is not required

or that the party requesting it is not so entitled. For example, the court may hold that

there is no final judgment from which an appeal may properly be taken. Alternatively,
the laches doctrine might provide a rationale in instances where the case has been long
dormant and other parties would be unduly prejudiced by the reactivation of the case.
See infra note 118 and accompanying text.

53. 886 F.2d 1462 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1080 (1990).
54. Id. at 1468-69.
55. Id. at 1469. Reid concerned the failure of the bankruptcy court to enter a
separate judgment pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9021. According to the court, the
separate document requirement of Bankruptcy Rule 9021 is identical to that of Civil
Procedure Rule 58. Id. at 1468. The discussion in Reid of the Mallis waiver doctrine

was later found specifically applicable to waiver of the Civil Procedure Rule 58 separate
judgment requirement. Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 192 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991).

56. 972 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1378
(1993).
57. Id. at 406.
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Health Center.8 In Fiore, the court found it appropriate, "absent
exceptional circumstances," to infer waiver of the separate judgment
requirement, pursuant to Mallis, where a party failed to act within three
months of the district court's last order in a case.59 The court found that
a party wishing to appeal and awaiting entry of judgment should move for
entry within that period.' Failure to act in that period would foreclose
appeal if the notice of appeal was untimely filed from the order of
dismissal." According to the court, "[t]his approach will guard against
the loss of review for those actually desiring a timely appeal while
preventing resurrection of litigation long treated as dead by the
parties."'
B. Analysis of the Case Law
1. The Mallis Waiver Doctrine is Inapplicable
As noted above, the majority of circuits addressing the issue endorse
the use of the Mallis waiver doctrine to allow appeals to proceed without
an intervening remand for entry of a separate judgment, even when the
notice of appeal was not timely filed from the order under appeal.63 One
of those circuits, however, also used the Mallis waiver doctrine to find
that appeals filed beyond three months after the last district court order
were forfeited.'6 Two other opinions, although not binding precedent in
any circuit, used the Mallis waiver doctrine to find a lack of appellate
jurisdiction due to the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. 6' In each
960 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1992) (en band).
Id. at 236.
Id.
Id.
62. Id. The First Circuit saw no conflict between its conclusion in Fiore
and Supreme Court precedent suggesting that [Civil Procedure] Rule 58's
technical requirements should be relaxed only to assist an appeal, not to
foreclose one. [citation omitted] Allowing a party to use the separate

58.
59.
60.
61.

document requirement to delay indefinitely an appeal would not serve [Civil
Procedure] Rule 58's purpose of protecting against mistakenly ill-timed
appeals. The three-month period generally should ensure that a failure to
appeal was a matter of choice, not confusion, and any further delay in finality

would serve no one's interest.
Id. at 236 n.ll. However, the court cited to no authority in support of its three-month
rule.
63. See supra notes 20 & 24 and accompanying text.
64. Fiore, 960 F.2d at 236.
65. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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of these decisions, however, the use of the Mallis waiver doctrine appears
to have been incorrect.
The majority position fails to recognize that use of the Mallis waiver
doctrine in these situations creates rather than cures a jurisdictional
quandary: upon waiver of the filing of a separate judgment, the timeliness
of the appellant's notice of appeal can only be measured from the district
court's final decision; if the notice of appeal was not filed after that
decision within the time period required by Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a),
the notice is untimely. Thus, in this regard, the minority view is
correct-waiver of a separate judgment under these circumstances leaves
the court of appeals without jurisdiction.
However, those circuit decisions which stopped at this point in their
analysis, and found no appellate jurisdiction, were also in error. In so
concluding, these decisions are in conflict with the policy statement in
Mallis that the separate judgment "'rule should be interpreted to prevent
loss of the right of appeal, not to facilitate loss.'"" Moreover, these
decisions also failed to take note of the distinction drawn in Mallis
between situations where the separate document requirement had to be
"mechanically applied" to save appellate jurisdiction, as in Indrelunas
(which involved a notice of appeal which was untimely if measured from
the order deemed final by the court of appeals but timely if measured from
the separate judgments entered by the district court), 67 and situations
where it did not, as in Mallis:
In United States v. Indrelunas, we recognized that the
separate-document rule must be "mechanically applied" in
determining whether an appeal is timely. Technical application
of the separate-judgment requirement is necessary in that context
to avoid the uncertainties that once plagued the determination of
when an appeal must be brought. 68
While the jurisdictional scenario under discussion does not fall
squarely within the parameters of Indrelunas (since, in that case, a
separate judgment was, in fact, entered and the Supreme Court appeared
to disagree with the conclusion of the court of appeals that the earlier
66. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 318, 386 (1978) (quoting 9 JAMES WM.
MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.08[2], at 119-120 (1970)). The current
edition of Moore's states that the "overriding principle in applying the separate document
requirement should be to preserve, not destroy, a party's opportunity to appeal." 6A

JAMES WM. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 58.02.1[2], at 58-20 (2d ed. 1994).
67. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216.
68. Mallis, 435 U.S. at 386 (citations omitted).
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order was the final decision in the case),69 it appears to be a closer fit
than Mallis (where the notice of appeal was timely filed from the final
decision).7" The very fact that a district court renders a final decision in
a case and fails to enter a separate judgment itself creates uncertainty as
Under most circumstances, both
to the proper time to appeal.
sophisticated and unsophisticated appellants may assume that a district
court is not abdicating its responsibilities and may thereby be lulled into
inaction and fail to file a protective notice of appeal until it is too late.71
While some judges have found that the filing of the notice of appeal
evidences the appellant's waiver of a separate judgment,' it is just as
likely that the appellant filed out of caution or fear, or in anticipation that
a judgment would eventually be filed, validating the notice of appeal nunc
pro tunc under Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2).7' Determining the
mental state of a particular appellant at the time the appellant filed a notice
of appeal would not only be unduly burdensome but would constitute the
type of "case-by-case tailoring" of the separate judgment requirement
rejected by the Supreme Court in Indrelunas.74 Thus, when the analysis
is focused on the uncertainty inherent in this situation, which, in fact, is
the primary factor underlying the separate judgment requirement itself,7'
the issue presented is clearly closer to the Indrelunas scenario than that
addressed by Mallis, where uncertainty as to finality, timeliness or the
intentions of the judge and parties was not an issue.76
69. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. at 219 (noting entry of formal judgments from which
appeal was taken), 221 (noting that earlier docket entry, which the court of appeals found
started the appeal period, reflected only the jury's liability determination without

specifying an amount due).
70. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the timeliness of

the notice of appeal in Mallis.
71. See, e.g., Fennell v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498, 499 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989)
(appeal permitted from final order without separate judgment entry; "We note in this
regard that it was at least arguably the responsibility of the district court and its clerk to
enter judgment without any action by the parties.").
72. Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heilig Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 85-1619, 1986 U.S. App.
LEXIS (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 966 (1986); Parisie v. Greer, 705
F.2d 882, 889 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983).
73. An appellant who filed a belated protective notice of appeal may have done so
either without first contacting the district court concerning the missing separate judgment

or after having an actual request for entry of a separate judgment denied.
74. United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221 (1973).
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 58 advisory committee notes on 1963 Amendment, 3-4.
76. This conclusion also applies to the three-month rule announced in Fiore which
was also based on the Mallis waiver doctrine. Fiore v. Washington County Community
Mental Health Ctr., 960 F.2d 229, 236 (1st Cir. 1992). The three-month rule is suspect
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Finally, the decisions which used the Mallis waiver doctrine to find
an absence of appellate jurisdiction run counter to clear indications from
the Supreme Court that delay in filing a notice of appeal where there is no
separate judgment is not determinative of the jurisdictional issue. In Jung
v. K. & D. Mining Co.,' the petitioners' first amended complaint was
dismissed and the petitioners were granted twenty days to file an amended
complaint.7" In lieu of filing another amended complaint, the petitioners
nearly two years later filed a motion electing to stand on their first
amended complaint. 9 The district court dismissed the case and the
petitioners filed a notice of appeal from that order.'
The court of
appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, holding that the earlier order
dismissing the first amended complaint became the final judgment when
an amended complaint was not thereafter filed within twenty days. 8 ' The
Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the later order dismissing the action
was the final judgment.' In so ruling, the Supreme Court found that the
earlier ruling left the case open for further proceedings and that the
petitioners' two year delay was not determinative:
Although to be sure nearly two years elapsed between the time
petitioners were given leave to file an amended complaint and
their motion of March 25, 1957 [electing to stand on their first
amended complaint], the defendants also did not, as they so easily
could have done, nor did the District Court exercising power sua
sponte over its own calendar, take any step to put a definitive end
to the case and thereby fix an unequivocal terminal date for
appealability. The undesirability of useless delays in litigation is
for an additional reason: there does not appear to be any statutory or judicial basis for
it. In fact, while the deadline may help in controlling the court's caseload, it appears to
conflict with the language, purposes and actual use of Indrelunas,Mallis and Appellate
Procedure Rule 4(a)(2). For example, if an appellant files a notice of appeal five months

after entry of the final decision in an action, and the district court thereafter enters a
separate judgment document, the Fiore rule would require dismissal of the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction while Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) would require a finding of
jurisdiction based on the later separate judgment.
77. 356 U.S. 335 (1958).

78. Id. at 336.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 337.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 337-38.
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more than offset by the hazards of confusion or misunderstanding
as to the time for appeal.83
In Shalala v. Schaefer," the Supreme Court found a fifteen month
delay after the final decision in that case irrelevant due to the absence of
a separate judgment document. 85 The plaintiff in Schaefer, a social
security case, prevailed by obtaining an order, on April 4, 1989, reversing
an administrative decision and remanding the case to the agency for
further proceedings.' After obtaining an award of benefits on remand,
the plaintiff returned to the district court and, on July 18, 1990, applied
for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act" (EAJA).
In opposing the motion, the government noted that the EAJA required the
plaintiff to file his fee motion within thirty days after a judgment becomes
"not appealable" (i.e., after the sixty-day appeal period of Rule 4(a)(1)),
and argued that this period ended ninety days after entry of the April 4,
1989 order.8 9 The government also argued that a separate judgment was
not necessary "for an order of the district court to become appealable[,]"
citing to Mallis and other authorities. 9' The Supreme Court rejected the
government's argument since the EAJA's thirty-day limit ran from the end
of the appeal period, not the beginning. 9' Thus, absent a separate
judgment, the April 4, 1989 order remained appealable at the time the
EAJA motion was filed, rendering that motion timely. 2 Moreover, the
Court stated that the failure of the district court to enter a separate
judgment under Civil Procedure Rule 58 was a burden that "the relevant
rules and statutes impose . . . on the party seeking to assert an
untimeliness defense. . .. "I To the extent that this comment imposes
the burden of the separate judgment requirement on the party alleging
83. Id. at 337 (emphasis added). Although Jung preceded promulgation of the
separate judgment requirement, the Court's conclusion that delay will be tolerated when

there may be confusion or misunderstanding regarding the time to appeal is still clearly
relevant and is consistent with Indrelunas.
84. 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993).

85. Id. at 2632.
86. Id. at 2628.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994).
88. Schaefer, 113 S.Ct. at 2628.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 2632.
Id. at 2628.
Id.
Id. at 2632 n.6.
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untimeliness,
it is clearly consistent with the above-quoted language from
94
Jung.
Thus, absent a separate judgment, notices of appeal filed beyond the
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1) time period after the final decision are
premature, not late.
For the foregoing reasons, of all the courts which have considered the
issue, only the Fifth Circuit in Townsend and Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor dissenting in Amoco Oil correctly found that the Mallis waiver
doctrine does not apply where its use would render the notice of appeal
untimely. 5 However, in the following discussion, it is suggested that the
remedial procedures outlined in Townsend and Amoco Oil-dismissal of
the appeal and return to the district court for entry of a separate judgment,
are neither appropriate nor required.96
2.

Dismissal of Appeal and Return to District Court for Entry of
Separate Judgment Should Not Be Required

The remedial procedures outlined in both Townsend and Amoco Oil
are primarily based on the statement in Indrelunas that the separate
document requirement must be mechanically applied in instances where
timeliness of an appeal is uncertain. 7 However, there is no statement in
Indrelunas which requires or even suggests that (a) such an appeal, which
would be deemed premature under Indrelunas, should be dismissed, or (b)
the parties should bear the burden of returning to district court to arrange
for the entry of judgment and the filing of a new notice of appeal.
Indrelunas does not discuss such matters because a judgment had, in fact,
been entered in that case and the notice of appeal was filed thereafter
within the appropriate time period.9" Thus, while Indrelunas requires the
94. The Court's reference to "the relevant rules and statutes" apparently
encompasses the EAJA, Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1), and the separate judgment

requirement of Civil Procedure Rule 58.
95. Townsend v. Lucas, 745 F.2d 933, 933-34 (5th Cir. 1984); Amoco Oil v. Jim

Heilig Oil & Gas, Inc., 479 U.S. 966, 969 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96. The Eighth Circuit, while requiring a remand for entry of a separate judgment

where untimeliness is alleged, did not reject the Mallis waiver doctrine in such situations.
In fact, the court stated, based on Parisieand Mallis, that it could consider the appeal

without a remand but believed that the better practice was to remand. In re Ozark
Restaurant Equip. Co., 761 F.2d 481,484 (8th Cir. 1985). In any event, for the reasons
discussed with regard to Townsend and Amoco Oil, this discretionary remand policy is
also not appropriate or required.

97. Amoco Oil, 479 U.S. at 967-69; Townsend, 745 F.2d at 934 (citing to Sassoon
v. United States, 549 F.2d 983, 985 (5th Cir. 1977), which, in turn, applies Indrelunas).
98. United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 219 (1973).
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entry of a separate judgment when the validity of the appeal is otherwise
rendered uncertain, it does not suggest a procedure for such entry.
The first step suggested by Townsend and Amoco Oil-dismissal of the
appeal-should be rejected since it conflicts with Appellate Procedure Rule
4(a)(2), which specifically governs the validity of notices of appeal filed
after the announcement of a decision or order but before entry of the
judgment. 9 Notices of appeal which fall within the scope of Appellate
Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) are not dismissed as premature; they are effective
and the appeal may proceed once the judgment is entered."l According
to the Supreme Court, in FirsTierMortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage
Insurance Co.," Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) recognizes that the
filing of a premature notice of appeal encompassed by that rule is a

"technical defect" which "should not be allowed to extinguish an
otherwise proper appeal." "

While Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2)

99. Rule 4(a)(2) was added to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1979,
well before the 1984 Townsend decision or the 1986 Amoco Oil dissent. According to
the Advisory Committee, it generally reflected the state of the law as of the time of its
adoption. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1979 Amendment to Appellate
Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) state that "[d]espite the absence of such a provision in Rule 4(a)
the courts of appeals quite generally have held premature appeals effective."
100. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven, 889 F.2d 428 (2d
Cir. 1989). In Long Island Lighting, "no judgment was entered on the order [under
appeal] until well after the oral argument of th[e] appeal when the district court, at [the
appellate] court's suggestion, directed the clerk of the court to enter an appropriate
judgment." Id. at 430. The court stated that although the notice of appeal was
"technically premature because filed over six months prior to entry of judgment," it was
to be treated as filed the day judgment was entered, rendering the appeal proper pursuant
to Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2). Id.; see also American Inter-Fidelity Exch. v.
American Re-Ins. Co., 17 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 1994) (after being alerted to
absence of separate judgment at oral argument, parties arranged for entry of judgment
and the court held that appellate jurisdiction existed under Appellate Procedure Rule
4(a)(2)).
101. 498 U.S. 269 (1991).
102. Id. at 273. The Supreme Court's complete statement regarding the origins of
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) is as follows:
Added to the Federal Rules in 1979, Rule 4(a)(2) was intended to codify a
general practice in the courts of appeals of deeming certain premature notices
of appeal effective. See Advisory Committee's Note on FED. R. APP. PROC.
4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. App., p. 516. The Rule recognizes that, unlike a tardy
notice of appeal, certain premature notices do not prejudice the appellee and
that the technical defect of prematurity therefore should not be allowed to
extinguish an otherwise proper appeal.
Id. While the general lack of prejudice stemming from premature notices of appeal
contributed to passage of the rule, the rule itself does not provide any exception for
instances where prejudice did, in fact, result. Even if such an exception is warranted,
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does not explicitly address the issue presented where a separate judgment
was never entered and the notice of appeal is untimely as measured from
the final decision, its language clearly encompasses the situation."°
The second step in the Townsend-Amoco Oil procedure, requiring the
parties to return to the district court for entry of judgment and the filing
of a new notice of appeal, conflicts with the policy of pragmatism and
efficiency underlying Mallis. Where the order under appeal is clearly the
final decision of the district court, it appears that requiring the parties to
return to the district court would entail the unnecessary "spinning of
wheels.""
Such a procedure will not only result in the unnecessary
expenditure of time, money and judicial resources, but it may also
frustrate the very purpose of the appellate process, that is, the timely
review of the decision of the district court."°5 Moreover, if the original,
it does not affect the conclusions reached here as such exceptions would need to be made
on a case-by-case basis.
103. See FED. R. APp. P. 4(a)(2). Permitting appeals which are premature under
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) to proceed once judgment is entered is consistent with
the treatment of appeals which are premature under Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(4).
When a notice of appeal is prematurely filed under Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(4),
there being a tolling motion pending in district court, the notice is, "in effect, suspended
until the motion is disposed of, whereupon the previously filed notice effectively places
jurisdiction in the court of appeals." FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4) advisory committee note
to 1993 Amendment. In other words, the notice of appeal "will ripen into an effective
appeal upon disposition of [the tolling] posttrial motion." Id.; see, e.g., Schroeder v.
McDonald, 41 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1994); see also IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund
v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1993) (in appeal where Appellate Procedure
Rules 4(a)(2) and (a)(4) did not apply, court held that "'a premature notice of appeal
from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been
entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice'") (citation
omitted). Cf. Strasburg v. State Bar of Wisconsin, 1 F.3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 1993)
(except where Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) applies, "the consequence of filing a
premature notice of appeal is appellate dismissal"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 698 (1994),
overruledin part on other grounds sub nom. Otis v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159,
1168 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc). See generally Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, When Will
Premature Notice of Appeal Be Retroactively Validated in Federal Civil Cases, 76
A.L.R. FED. 199 (1986 Supp. 1994).
104. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 385 (1978).
105. In Otis v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit described the problems inherent
in requiring an unsophisticated appellant to return to the district court for entry of a
separate judgment:
Waiting for a formal [Civil Procedure] Rule 58 judgment would not serve any
purpose, but could well frustrate appellate review. .

.

.

Requiring [the

appellant] to ask the district court for a [Civil Procedure] Rule 58
judgment-and to seek a writ of mandamus if the judge does not supply the
necessary document-would be the practical equivalent of denying her the right
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premature appeal is effective once a separate judgment is entered, the

filing of a new notice of appeal is unnecessary.
However, the policy considerations underlying Mallis were clearly
limited to instances where "the only obstacle to appellate review" is the
absence of a separate judgment.'
Thus, where other obstacles, such
as a timeliness issue, are present, those policy considerations, while still
relevant, are not controlling and the dictates of Indrelunas must be met.
It is suggested that the following recommended procedures would
reconcile and effectuate the Indrelunas "mechanical application"
requirement, Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) and the Mallis policy
considerations and avoid the unwieldy procedures suggested in Townsend
and Amoco Oil.
3.

Recommended Procedures

To effectuate Indrelunas, Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) and the
policy considerations underlying Mallis-in the context of a notice of
appeal filed beyond the Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1) time period
following entry of a final decision where a separate judgment was never
entered-the following four alternative approaches are possible:
1. The court of appeals may stay the appeal, order the district court
to enter a separate judgment, and proceed with the appeal only after the
separate judgment is entered;"
of appellate review. If [the appellant] herself overcame the obstacle, others in
her position would not, and all would suffer unnecessary delay.
Otis, 29 F.3d 1159, 1165-66. Moreover, requiring the parties to return to the district
court would primarily burden the appellant, while the Supreme Court suggested in
Schaefer that the burden resulting from the district court's failure to enter a separate
judgment should rest "on the party seeking to assert an untimeliness defense." Shalala
v. Schaefer, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 2632 n.6 (1993).
106. Mallis, 435 U.S. at 386 (emphasis added). The full quotation from Mallis is
as follows: "[I]f the only obstacle to appellate review is the failure of the District Court
to set forth its judgment on a separate document, 'there would appear to be no point in
obliging the appellant to undergo the formality of obtaining a formal judgment.'" Id.
(quoting 9 JAMES WM. MOoRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.08[2], at 120 n.7
(1970)).
107. This procedure is similar to that used when an Appellate Procedure Rule
4(a)(4) post-judgment tolling motion is pending when a notice of appeal is filed. In that
instance, the appeal is stayed, or held in abeyance, until the tolling motion is decided,
at which time the appeal may proceed. See supra note 103.
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2. The court of appeals may order the district court to enter a
separate judgment without staying the appeal, and allow the appeal to
proceed while the district court arranges for that entry; 08
3. The court of appeals may proceed with the appeal and order entry

of a separate judgment only at the end of the appeal in its dispositional
order or opinion; or
4. The court of appeals may, as a fiction of law," °
judgment filed on or after the date the notice of appeal was
proceed to the merits of the appeal with no further action
separate judgment. 0
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that a court of

deem the
filed, and
as to the
appeals is

not without authority to issue binding orders in an appeal which is
premature. Even if it is assumed that a court of appeals has minimal
jurisdictional leeway in such situations, it may, under the All Writs Act,

"issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [its] respective
jurisdictionl."11 In construing the All Writs Act, the Supreme Court
has held that "the authority of the appellate court 'is not confined to the
issuance of writs in aid of a jurisdiction already acquired by appeal but
108. This approach is similar to the informal procedure used by various circuits to
obtain entry of a separate judgment by the district court, in lieu of a formal stay,
dismissal or remand. See, e.g., American Inter-Fidelity Exch. v. American Re-Ins. Co.,
17 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 1994) (after being alerted to absence of separate judgment
at oral argument, parties arranged for entry of judgment; appellate jurisdiction found
under Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2)); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of
Brookhaven, 889 F.2d 428, 430 (2d Cir. 1989) (judgment entered by district court, at
suggestion of court of appeals, after oral argument of the appeal; appeal was found
proper under Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2)).
109. Black's Law Dictionary defines "fiction of law" as follows:
An assumption or supposition of law that something which is or may be
false is true, or that a state of facts exists which has never really taken place.
An assumption, for purposes of justice, of a fact that does not or may not
exist. A rule of law which assumes as true, and will not allow to be
disproved, something which is false, but not impossible.
These assumptions are of an innocent or even beneficial character, and are
made for the advancement of the ends ofjustice. They secure this end chiefly
by the extension of procedure from cases to which it is applicable to other
cases to which it is not strictly applicable, the ground of inapplicability being
some difference of an immaterial character.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
110. This alternative involves a bit of circular logic: the separate judgment would
be deemed filed on or after the date the notice of appeal was filed; however, under
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2), the premature notice of appeal is deemed filed as of
the date of entry of the judgment. However, since there is a date-certain for the filing
of the notice of appeal, the circularity issue is minor.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988).
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extends to those cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction although
no appeal has been perfected."' 2 Thus, in appropriate circumstances,
a court of appeals may act to preserve its "potential jurisdiction." "
Furthermore, the court of appeals is empowered by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 10(e), which allows for the correction of omissions
in the record, to order that a separate judgment be entered when its
absence is due to error or accident." 4 Aside from Appellate Procedure
Rule 10(e), various courts of appeals also claim the inherent authority to
supplement or correct the record. 5
The four alternative approaches are listed in order of (a) increasing
efficiency, the first being least efficient, the fourth being the most
efficient; and (b) decreasing conformity with the dictates of Indrelunas and

Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2), the first alternative conforming most

closely, the fourth being furthest from conforming. Although it can
reasonably be argued that all four alternatives are consistent with
Indrelunas, Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) and the policy considerations
112. FTC v. Dean Foods, 384 U.S. 597, 603-04 (1966) (quoting Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943)).
113. Dean Foods, 384 U.S. at 603-04; Michael v. INS, 48 F.3d 657, 663-64 (2d

Cir. 1995).
114. Fed. R. App. P. 10(e) provides as follows:
(e) Correction or Modification of the Record.
If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred
in the district court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that
court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to
either party is omitted from the record by erroror accident or is misstated
therein, the parties by stipulation, or the district court, either before or after
the record is transmitted to the court of appeals, or the court of appeals, on
proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the omission or
misstatement be corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental record be
certified and transmitted. All other questions as to the form and content of the
record shall be presented to the court of appeals.
Id. (emphasis supplied). See, e.g., GHR Energy v. Crispin Co., 791 F.2d 1200, 120102 (5th Cir. 1986) (notice of appeal from bankruptcy court to district court that appellant
had not properly made part of record was ordered added to the record under Appellate
Procedure Rule 10(e)); United States v. Becker, 536 F.2d 471, 474 (1st Cir. 1976)
(ordered correction of district court docket entry concerning sentence, pursuant to
Appellate Procedure Rule 10(e)); United States v. Jarratt, 471 F.2d 226, 230-31 (9th Cir.
1972) (remanded case to permit district court to correct, pursuant to Appellate Procedure
Rule 10(e), discrepancy between sentence noted in sentencing hearing transcript and
sentence appearing in written judgment of conviction), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969
(1973).
115. See Dakota Indus. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 63 (8th Cir.
1993); Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1521 (9th Cir. 1989); Ross v. Kemp, 785 F.2d
1467, 1477 (11th Cir. 1986).
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underlying Mallis, the use of alternative two is recommended as the
closest fit.
Alternative one unnecessarily assumes that no further appellate activity
should take place until the separate judgment is entered. However, there
is nothing in Indrelunas or Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) which
requires such a conservative approach and, since the overwhelming
majority of these appeals will go forward, there is no clear jurisdictional
impediment to proceeding while the mechanical entry of the separate
judgment is accomplished. The appellate activities that would take place
in the short period between the issuance of an appellate order requiring
entry of a separate judgment and the district court's response to that order
(as outlined in alternative two) are unlikely to be anything other than
nondispositive and ministerial in nature. Thus, while the absence of a
separate judgment might bring into question the authority of an appellate
court to issue dispositive rulings pending entry of the judgment, it should
not prevent the court from performing mere preparatory tasks." 6
Additionally, the delay engendered by alternative one would run counter
to the policy considerations of Mallis-both the parties and the courts
would be put to needless expense and effort, and appeal processing time
would lengthen.
Alternatives three and four, on the other hand, would present two
possible jurisdictional problems. First, as suggested above, it is unlikely
that a court of appeals has the authority to issue a dispositive ruling in a
premature appeal. Alternative three, by including the order for entry of
a separate judgment in the dispositive appellate ruling, does not
satisfactorily resolve the issue as it does not provide for the separate
judgment entry to precede the appellate disposition. Although alternative
four avoids this problem by permitting the court to deem the separate
judgment entered prior to the dispositive appellate ruling, it runs counter
to the clear requirement of Indrelunas that the separate judgment rule be
"mechanically applied" where there is any uncertainty as to the entry date
of a judgment." 7 "Mechanical application" of this rule could only mean
that an actual separate judgment must be prepared and a docket clerk must
actually make the appropriate entry on the docket before the rule can be
deemed satisfied.
116. Thus, in both American Inter-Fidelity Exch. v. American Re-Ins. Co., 17 F.3d
1018 (7th Cir. 1994), and Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven, 889 F.2d
428 (2d Cir. 1989), the appeal was scheduled, the parties' briefs were filed, and oral

argument was held before entry of the separate judgment was arranged.

In both

instances, jurisdiction was found under Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2). American
Inter-Fidelity Exch., 17 F.3d at 1020; Long Island Lighting Co., 889 F.2d at 430.
117. U.S. v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1973).
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Second, alternatives three and four ignore the possibility that the

district court may have had good reason for not entering a separate
judgment. Although it may appear certain to the court of appeals that the
district court has issued its final decision in an action and all that is
lacking is a separate judgment, such appearances are often deceiving.
Both district court docket sheets and the records on appeal are, not
infrequently, incomplete or otherwise misleading regarding the procedural
status of an action. It is possible that, contrary to all appearances, the
action in question is still proceeding in district court as to some claims or

parties. It is also possible that the decision in question is not perceived by

the district court as one which requires a separate judgment." 8
Alterrtive two avoids the foregoing problems by (a) allowing the
appeal to proceed pending either entry of the separate judgment by the

district court or submission by that court of an explanation of why entry
is deemed inappropriate, and (b) providing for that entry or explanation
prior to final disposition of the appeal by the appellate court. If entry is
made, the appellate court may reach a final disposition in full compliance

with Indrelunas, Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) and the policies
underlying Mallis. If the district court informs the court of appeals that
a separate judgment is inappropriate, the court of appeals can then address
that issue, and, if the district court is correct, avoid reaching a final
disposition in the absence of jurisdiction. 19

118. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 984 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
no separate judgment necessary when § 2255 motion is denied; noting that district courts
within circuit disagreed as to need for separate judgment); see also 15B CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3915, at 262-63 & n.15 (1992)
(noting instances where district courts refused to enter judgment). As noted supra note
52, there may be cases where the district court believes the laches doctrine should
prevent reactivation of long dormant appeals, notwithstanding language in Indrelunas,
Jung, and Schaefer suggesting that delay is not the governing factor where uncertainty
as to the time to appeal is concerned. See infra note 204 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the laches doctrine.
119. The author offers the following example of language that may be used in a
court of appeals order where it appears that a separate judgment which would permit a
notice of appeal to be found timely was erroneously omitted by the district court:
It appears from the district court docket sheet and other materials available to
this court that the final decision in this action was entered on [date] and that
no separate judgment document meeting the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
58 was entered. The district court is hereby directed to either enter a separate
judgment document or submit an explanation of why such document is not
required, within ten days of the date of this order.
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III. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON THE DOCKET
AND THE WAIVER DOCTRINE

In Mallis, the Supreme Court limited its ruling on the waiver doctrine
to situations where a separate judgment was lacking; 2 ' it did not rule
that the parties could waive the related Civil Procedure Rule 58
requirement that judgment be entered on the docket in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a). The relevant portion of Civil
Procedure Rule 58 states that "[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a
separate document. A judgment is effective only when so set forth and
21
when entered as provided in [Civil Procedure] Rule 79(a)."
While stating that the "sole purpose of the separate-document
requirement . . was to clarify when the time for appeal . . begins to
run," 12 the Supreme Court found an additional rationale for the docket
entry requirement: it fulfilled a "public recordkeeping function over and
above the giving of notice to the losing party that a final decision has been
entered against it. " " Although this discussion in Mallis is dicta, the
court was clearly suggesting that the two requirements may not be equally
waivable since the docket entry requirement served an additional, perhaps
greater, purpose than the separate document requirement 24 Thus,
Mallis leaves open the question of whether the docket entry requirement
is waivable at all; or is waivable upon a greater showing than for waiver
of the separate document requirement; or, in spite of the Supreme Court's
dicta in Mallis, is waivable on terms comparable to the separate document
waiver doctrine."'
The three possibilities left open by Mallis are reflected in the few
circuit opinions which discuss the docket entry requirement. At one
extreme is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Carterv. Beverly Hills Savings
120. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 385-86 (1978).
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
122. Mallis, 435 U.S. at 384.
123. Id. at 384 n.4.
124. However, at least one circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court's discussion
of the entry requirement in Mallis as concluding that the docket entry requirement fulfills
a lesser function than the separate judgment requirement. After noting that the separate
document requirement clarifies when the time to appeal begins to run, the Seventh
Circuit in C.I.T. Fin. Serv. v. Yeomans, 710 F.2d 416, 417 n.5 (7th Cir. 1983),
contrasted the docket entry requirement by stating that it "merely fulfills a public
recordkeeping function." Id. (citing Mallis, 435 U.S. at 384 & n.4).
125. As with the separate judgment requirement, a discussion of the docket entry
requirement is complicated by the several meanings that have been given to the phrase
"entry ofjudgment." As discussed later in the text, it is often difficult to determine what
usage was intended in particular decisions. See supra note 19.
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& Loan Association," 6 which suggests that the docket entry requirement
may not be waivable since the Mallis decision "indicated" that a judgment
which has not been entered pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) "may
not be final."' z Linking the docket entry requirement to the finality
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 129111 would appear to make the failure
to enter judgment on the docket a non-waivable defect. However, the
Carter decision appears to be the only one which picked up on the
Supreme Court's dicta in Mallis that "it is arguable that a decision must

be entered on the civil docket before it may constitute a 'final decision'
for purposes of § 1291." 129

At the other extreme is another Ninth Circuit decision, Neill v. City

of Concord,30 which failed to discuss the finality issue raised in Carter

and simply found the docket entry requirement waivable.1 1 Neill is in

126. 884 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990).
127. Id. at 1190. The language in Carterconcerning the docket entry requirement's
relation to the finality doctrine may be dicta since the court found that the decision at
issue was, in fact, properly entered on the docket. Id. However, the entry was not of
a judgment that complied with the separate document requirement of Civil Procedure
Rule 58. Id.
The district court's docket entry involved in Carterwas as follows: "3-25-85 sb 18.
crt dism actn reason of settlnmt & retnjurdctn 60 reopen if settlmnt not completed (ENT
3-26-85) MD JS 6 Mid cpys." Rather than showing that a separate order had been filed
and entered as required by Civil Procedure Rule 58, the court found this to reflect only
the entry of the minutes of the action taken by the district judge at a pretrial conference.
In a previous case, the Ninth Circuit had found that the filing of similar minutes did not
comply with the separate document requirement of Civil Procedure Rule 58. Id. at 118990.
Although both the majority and dissenting judges in Carteragreed that the docket
entry was sufficient for Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) purposes, they appeared to disagree
on whether the docket entry needed to explicitly state that a separate document was filed
and entered. Id. at 1190, 1193-94.
128. 28 U.S.C. 1291 (1988).
129. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 n.4 (1978).
130. No. 90-15556, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15442 (9th Cir. June 26, 1992).
Pursuant to the rules of the Ninth Circuit, the Neill opinion was not deemed appropriate
for publication and the courts of the Ninth Circuit are forbidden from citing it except
under limited circumstances. U.S.C.S. CT. APP. 9TH CIR., CIRCurr R. 36-3 (LAW. CooP. 1995). Notwithstanding this limitation, the opinion is still likely to be of some
persuasive value in subsequent cases since its reasoning is a logical extension of the
Mallis decision.
131. Neill, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15442, at *4.As support for its waiver ruling,
the court cited to Mallis and two Ninth Circuit cases which concerned waiver of the Civil
Procedure Rule 58 separate document requirement, Allah v. Superior Court, 871 F.2d
887 (9th Cir. 1989), and Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1987). In both
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accord with the Third and Seventh Circuits which have also held that
requirement waivable."' While the Third Circuit focused on the fact

that there clearly was a final disposition in that case, making remand for
the ministerial act of entering judgment on the docket unnecessary,' 33 the
Seventh Circuit focused on the possible prejudice to the litigants, stating
that "the absence of an entry does not preclude appellate jurisdiction in the
absence of demonstrated prejudice to the litigants." "
Allah and Vernon, the court found there was no "entry" of judgment because, although
the district court's orders were actually entered on the civil docket, there was no separate
document setting forth the district court's judgment. Allah, 871 F.2d at 889-90; Vernon,
811 F.2d at 1276. Thus, while the court used the phrase "entry" to describe the
deficiency in each of these cases, it was actually concerned with the lack of a separate
document. In both instances, this broader definition of "entry" was drawn from FED.
R. App. P. 4(a)(6) (now FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)). See supra note 19 for a discussion
of the varying definitions of "entry."
132. Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v.
Thompson Farms, 642 F.2d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir. 1981) (court failed to direct entry of
judgment as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), judgment was not
entered on docket by clerk and no separate document was filed pursuant to Civil
Procedure Rule 58; court found all three requirements were validly waived, thus giving
the appellate court jurisdiction over the appeal); Hamilton v. Stillwell Van and Storage,
343 F.2d 453,455 (3d Cir. 1965) (court declined to remand for formal entry ofjudgment
"in the clerk's record" as there clearly was a final disposition of the case and only the
ministerial entry of judgment by the clerk was lacking).
133. Hamilton, 343 F.2d at 455.
134. Local P-171, 642 F.2d at 1072. The holding in Local P-171 appears to be
consistent with the Seventh Circuit's later statement that, in comparison to the separate
document requirement of Civil Procedure Rule 58, Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) "merely"
fulfills a public recordkeeping function. C.I.T. Fin. Serv. v. Yeomans, 710 F.2d 416,
417 n.5 (7th Cir. 1983). However, the holding in Local P-171 that both the entry
requirement of Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) and the separate document requirement of
Civil Procedure Rule 58 may simultaneously be waived, Local P-171, 642 F.2d at 1072,
is inconsistent with the statement in C.LT. Fin. Serv. that one of the prerequisites for
finding a proper Civil Procedure Rule 58 waiver was "a judgment recorded in the clerk's
docket," C.LT. Fin. Serv., 710 F.2d at 417 n.6 (although docket entry requirement was
met, court found no appellate jurisdiction due to absence of any document indicating final
judgment was rendered; Mallis waiver rule not implicated because document that was
missing was not the judgment, but the order, opinion or transcript evidencing the court's
final decision). In a later unpublished case, the Seventh Circuit apparently overlooked
the LocalP-171 decision when it posed the following issue: "May the parties waive entry
ofjudgment [on the docket] when a separate document sufficient under [Civil Procedure]
Rule 58 exists announcing the judgment? Surprisingly, we have found no case that
answers this question." Crotty v. City of Chicago Heights, No. 90-2572, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19093, at *9 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991) ("unpublished order not to be cited
per Seventh Circuit Rule 53;" reported at table 940 F.2d 665). See U.S.C.S. CT. App.
7TH CIR., CiRcurr R. 53 (LAw. Co-op. 1995). The court in Crotty goes on to suggest
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The Eighth Circuit has also allowed waiver of the Civil Procedure
Rule 79(a) entry requirement, although it is unclear if the court recognized
that the issue was distinguishable from the Civil Procedure Rule 58
separate document issue. In Sanders v. Clemco Industries,3 5 the court
noted that
[t]he district court never entered a final judgment on a separate
document as required by Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the clerk of the district court did not make an
entry of a final judgment on the docket sheet as required by Rule
79(a), but noted the filing of the Memorandum and Order
[granting summary judgment for the defendants] on November 6,
1987.136
However, this description of the facts was followed by an analysis which
addressed only the question of whether the separate document requirement
was waived by the parties. 3 7 Thus, it is unclear whether the court
deemed the Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) entry requirement to be
encompassed by the separate judgment waiver doctrine or if it considered
the docket entry requirement satisfied by the entry concerning the
memorandum and order on the summary judgment motion. The former
alternative appears more likely given the court's specific language
regarding the absence of a final judgment docket entry, its failure to state
Procedure
that the memorandum and order docket entry satisfied the Civil
38
Rule 79(a) requirement, and its failure to quote that entry.
The Second Circuit's position on waiver of the docket entry
requirement is similarly unclear. In Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of
Brookhaven,'39 after noting that a separate judgment was not entered
that the Mallis waiver rule may apply since, "assuming that it is clear the district court
has rendered a final decision, dismissing the appeal would cause nothing but pointless
delay since the district court would simply tell the clerk to enter a proper judgment on
the docket." Crotty, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19093, at *9 (appeal resolved on other

grounds).
135. 862 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1988).

136. Id. at 166 (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 166-68.
138. See id. The failure to quote the memorandum and order entry also makes it
impossible to opine whether it would meet the rather minimal requirement suggested by
the Mallis decision where the court suggested that the following constituted a proper
entry of a judgment of dismissal: "Complaint dismissed in its entirety. So Ordered.
Pollack, J. (mn)." Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 382 n.1, 384 n.4

(1978).
139. 889 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1989).
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after the district court dismissed the action, the court stated that "if the
parties consent to the appeal of an order, even without entry of a
judgment, the court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. " "
Mallis was cited in support of this proposition with a parenthetical stating
that the "parties to appeal may waive separate judgment requirement."' 4l
Based on the difference in language between the parenthetical and the
proposition preceding the Mallis citation (and language earlier in the
decision concerning the requirements of Civil Procedure Rules 58 and
79(a)), it could be argued that the court was fully aware of the difference
between the docket entry requirement and the separate document
requirement and intended to hold that the entry requirement was
waivable.142 However, the fact that the court never discussed the
possibility that the entry of the dismissal order itself constituted the Civil
Procedure Rule 79(a) entry of judgment, as in Mallis,143 suggests that
either the court was blurring the distinction between the docket entry and
separate document requirements or was focusing exclusively on the fact
that a separate document labeled "judgment" was not entered, and
overlooked the possibility that the dismissal order entry could constitute
the "entry of judgment" under Civil Procedure Rule 79(a).11
Finally, the Tenth Circuit has also rendered an ambiguous decision
which may or may not hold the docket entry requirement waivable. In
Carey, Baxter & Kennedy, Inc. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 4 the appellee
moved for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that "the judgment of the
trial court [was] not in the record."'" Although the findings and
conclusions of the district court were before the court of appeals, the
appellee contended, according to the court, that "the clerk's entry of
judgment [was] not in the record and hence there [was] no assurance that
140. Id. at 430. After argument of the appeal in Long IslandLighting, the district
court entered judgment. This entry was found to validate the appeal nuncpro tunc under
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2). Id. The analysis discussed in the text was an
alternative holding of the court.
141. Id.
142. The court may have used the word "entry" to refer to either Civil Procedure
Rule 79(a) docket entry alone or, pursuant to Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(7), to both
the docket entry and the separate judgment requirements. In either event, its language
suggested that the docket entry was waivable.
143. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 382 n.1 & 384 n.4 (1978).
144. See Long Island Lighting, 889 F.2d 428.
145. 346 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1965).
146. Id. at 112.
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it was ever entered; that there [was] not a judgment to review.""
finding the motion without merit, the court stated the following:

In

It is the duty of the clerk to enter the judgment on the civil
docket. See Rules 58 and 79(a), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. It must be presumed that the clerk performed this
duty and [appellee] does not seriously question this. Nor is the
finality of the court's order... questioned. The contention thus
reduces to a most technical one which does not merit attention.
It would be indeed impractical to dismiss or even stay this appeal
so as to obtain the showing demanded. We conclude that the
findings and conclusions [before the court] furnish the requisite
evidence of the judgment appealed from so as to render
unnecessary the final entry." 4
At least one treatise has considered this case as holding that entry on
the docket may be waived. 4 9 Due to the imprecise language used by
the court, however, it appears equally likely that the court was concerned
with the absence of a separate judgment document, not the absence of the
judgment entry on the docket sheet. This alternative interpretation is
based on the court's statement that the clerk is presumed to have
"enter[ed] judgment on the civil docket and [appellee] does not seriously
question this." "' The court may have been stating that since the
judgment was reflected on the civil docket, there was no need to remand
to allow the district court to file a separate judgment document in the
record. However, the ambiguous use of the words "record" and "entry"
makes it impossible to firmly conclude which alternative the Tenth Circuit
intended.151
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE& PROCEDURE § 2781 n.1 1
(1995) ("Court heard appeal by presuming that the judgment was entered in the docket
even though it was not shown to have been entered.").
150. Carey, Baxter & Kennedy, 346 F.2d at 112.
151. As previously noted, "entry ofjudgment" is frequently used to mean either (a)
entry in the docket (pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 79(a)) or (b) entry in the docket
and filing of a separate judgment document (pursuant to Appellate Procedure Rule
4(a)(7)) or, in its broadest sense, (c)the court's actual rendering of the judgment. See
supra note 19. Additionally, "record" can either refer to the documents filed in a case
or the docket itself. Black's Law Dictionary defines "record," under the "court record
of proceedings" subheading, as both "It]he official collection of all the trial pleadings,
exhibits, orders and word-for-word testimony that took place during the trial[,]" and as
consisting primarily of the "civil docket" in civil cases and the "criminal docket" in
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As suggested by the preceding discussion, none of the cases which
concern the Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) entry requirement analyze the

waiver issue in any detail.'

While one might conclude that the courts

generally deem the docket entry requirement waivable on terms similar to

the separate document waiver doctrine, the absence of any clear and
cogent analysis renders this conclusion of minimal value. However, as
discussed below, the relevant authorities, and common sense, permit the
following conclusions: the docket entry requirement should be broadly
construed; it should not be deemed jurisdictional; and only in narrow
circumstances should it be deemed waivable.
1. The Docket Entry Requirement Should Be Broadly Construed
First, and perhaps most important, the issue can be avoided in most

instances if the courts follow the lead of the Supreme Court in Mallis by
broadly defining what qualifies as entry of judgment on the docket. In

Mallis, the court stated that "[a] judgment of dismissal was entered [on the
docket]'
in this case below" when the following entry was made:
"Complaint dismissed in its entirety. So ordered. Pollack, J. (mn)."154
Thus, although the word "judgment" was not used,'55 the clear meaning
criminal cases. BLACK'S LAWv DICTIONARY 1273 (6th ed. 1990); see FED. R. APP. P.
10(a) (record on appeal is composed of "[tihe original papers and exhibits filed in the
district court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the docket
entries prepared by the clerk of the district court. ... "). Thus, the claim that there was

no "judgment in the record" or no "entry of judgment in the record" may either mean
that a separate judgment document was not filed or that no entry was made on the
docket.
152. See supra notes 126, 130, 132, 135, 139, 145 and accompanying text.

153. The bracketed words were added to make clear that the court used the word
"entry" to refer only to FED. R. Civ. P. 79(a) entry. The FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)
meaning was clearly not intended since that meaning would encompass the filing of a
separate judgment document, which did not occur.
154. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 382 n.1, 384 n.4 (1978).
155. Thus, the Court in Mallis disapproved, sub silentlo, of cases requiring use of
the word "judgment" to indicate that a docket notation constituted entry of a judgment.
See Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 323 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1963), where the
court stated the following:
[W]e deem it significant that the memorandum opinion and entry prepared by
the clerk did not include the word "judgment." While it is settled that there

are no required forms or words to constitute a judgment, it has been said that:
"It is difficult to conceive of a Clerk purporting to engage in an act of
'notation of a judgment' or 'entry of the judgment' under the Rules, without
some use of the term 'judgment' itself in relation to the act, in view of the
fixed identity and characterizing significance which the word has in the field
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of the entry was that (a) the case was at an end by means of a final

disposition (b) which was rendered by an authorized judicial officer. Such
a construction of the docket entry requirement will eliminate most
potential Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) issues.

If, on the other hand, an

entry fails to indicate the disposition of the case or simply states, "case
closed," without any indication of who prevailed or the authority by which

it was closed, 5 ' it cannot properly be said to be a judgment, which is

a judicial act of a judicial officer.'S

of the law."
Id. at 117 (quoting Brown v. United States, 225 F.2d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1955), which
stated that although the "actual use of the term may perhaps not always be . . .
necessary, it would seem that there reasonably would be . . . at least some . . .
expression ... which represents 'the end of the law.'").

156. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Wade, 241 F.2d 208,210 (9th Cir. 1957), where entries
stating, "Mar. 26 Opinion filed" and "April 23 Judgment filed and entered[,]" were
found to not qualify as proper entries of judgment. The court stated:
We do not reach here the question of how poor an entry can be and still
be a judgment. A docket entry that doesn't even say who won, surely cannot
qualify. The substance of a judgment just is not in this docket. United States
v. Cooke is apposite, but the facts here are really more like the situation where
the clerk has written nothing.
Id. (citation omitted).
In Cooke, an entry stating, "Filing decision (McLaughlin - Favor Plaintiff)," was
found insufficient since "the bare statements of the names of the successful litigants
without stating the amounts of their respective recoveries do not constitute a showing of
the 'substance' of the judgments." United States v. Cooke, 215 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir.
1954). The facts in Cooke were distinguished from cases holding valid (a) an entry that
the judgment was in favor of the defendant where it is apparent from the entry that the
plaintiffs were denied any relief and the substance of the judgment is shown; (b) entries
showing the amounts of the plaintiffs' recoveries; and (c)
an entry noting the grant of a
summary judgment which was in the amount claimed by the plaintiffs. Id.
157. The Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the term "judgment" as follows:
A "judgment" for purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would
appear to be equivalent to a "final decision" as that term is used in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Federal Rule Civ. Proc. 54(a), for example, provides that
"'j]udgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from
which an appeal lies."
Mallis, 435 U.S. at 384 n.4 (citations omitted).
The "judicial officers" who are authorized to render judgment include not only
judges but also magistrate judges and clerks of court when authorized by federal or local
rules. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1994) (upon consent of parties, magistrate judge
may, inter alia, enter judgment); FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) (authorizing entry of default
judgment by clerk); FED. R. CIV. P. 77(c) (same).
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2. The Entry Requirement Should Not Be Deemed Jurisdictional
Second, the pertinent case law, federal rules and historical sources
strongly suggest that the docket entry requirement should not be deemed
a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review. 5 While entry of
judgment on the docket, like the separate judgment document, evidences
the existence of a final decision, it is not an element of finality. Finality
is determined by the nature of the court's ruling-if there is nothing more
to be done in a case and the court has rendered a disposition formally
ending it, the disposition is final. This is consistent with the Supreme
Court's description of a final decision in Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 59 as a decision by the district court that "'ends the litigation
on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment. ' ""
lc
The Supreme Court's suggestion in Mallis that entry on the civil
docket might be required before a decision is deemed final under 28
U.S.C. § 1291161 is based on the portion of Civil Procedure Rule 58 that
states that a "'judgment is effective only . . . when entered as provided
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).'' 62 However, the full
quotation from Civil Procedure Rule 58 states that a "judgment is effective
only when so set forth [on a separate document] and when entered as
Thus, the same logic
provided in [Civil Procedure] Rule 79(a)." 6
would also make the separate judgment requirement a jurisdictional
prerequisite, a result the court easily rejected in the text of its
decision.)" As with the separate document requirement, even if entry
158. See infra notes 159-193 and accompanying text.
159. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
160. Id. at 467 (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
162. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 n.4 (1978).
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
164. Prior to the 1963 amendment to Civil Procedure Rule 58 which added the
reference to the separate document requirement to the sentence quoted in the text, that
sentence read as follows: "The notation of a judgment in the civil docket as provided
by 79(a) constitutes the entry of the judgment; and the judgment is not effective before
such entry." FED. R. Civ. P. 58 (1962); see also Proceedings of the Institute on Federal
Rules, Cleveland, Ohio, July 21-23, 1938, at 370 (A.B.A. 1938), comments of William
D. Mitchell, chair of Advisory Committee:
We wanted to be absolutely sure that there was no ambiguity in these rules as
to when a judgment was entered (that is, when it became effective as a
judgment) and we expressly said there [in Rule 58] that the entry in the civil
docket and the notification entry in the docket by the clerk constitutes the
entry. Your time for appeal runs from that date, and the judgment isn't
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appears to be "mandatory" under the rules, that by itself does not make

it jurisdictional or nonwaivable. 1s
The additional factor suggested by the Supreme Court, that the Civil
Procedure Rule 79(a) requirement "fulfills a public recordkeeping function

over and above the giving of notice to the losing party that a final decision
has been entered against it[,]" ' also fails to adequately distinguish the

docket entry requirement from the separate document requirement. Both
the docket sheet and the separate judgment document in the case file are
accessible to, and are frequently used by, the parties to the action, the

general public and court officials. Thus, both requirements fulfill similar
public recordkeeping functions and both give notice to the losing parties
that a final decision has been entered. However, even if the two
requirements can be distinguished along the lines drawn by the Supreme
Court, it appears that the court reversed the importance of the functions
served by the two requirements. In regard to public recordkeeping, the
separate document requirement is probably the more important of the two
since, in the event of a discrepancy between the docket entry and the
separate judgment document, which occurs with some frequency, the
language of the judgment document controls. 67 The judgment document
is also of greater importance than its parallel docket entry when the res
effective as a judgment until that is done.
Id. However, as with the current rule, there is no indication in the history of Rule 58
that the entry requirement was deemed jurisdictional.
165. In Mallis, although the Court held that the separate document requirement must
be "mechanically applied," Mallis, 435 U.S. at 386 (quoting Indrelunas, 411 U.S. at
221-22), and "assume[d], without deciding, that the requirements for an effective
judgment set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must generally be satisfied
before § 1291 jurisdiction may be invoked," the Court "nonetheless concluded] that it
could not have been intended that the separate-document requirement of Rule 58 be such
a categorical imperative that the parties are not free to waive it." Mallis, 435 U.S. at
384.
166. Id. at 384 n.4.
167. "Where., a formal judgment is signed by the judge, this is primafacie the
decision or judgment rather than a statement in an opinion or a docket entry[.]" United
States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 235 (1958); (quoting United
States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1944)). It is noted, however, that certain formal
judgments may now be prepared, signed and entered by the clerk "without awaiting any
direction by the court," pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 58. Even if a judgment signed
by the clerk does not have primafacie effect, it still should take precedence over a
docket entry as it is typically prepared directly from the court's opinion or verdict form
while the information in the docket entry may simply come from the previously prepared
judgment.
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judicata effect or, more generally, the precedential value of a decision and
judgment must be determined."
However, in regard to the giving of notice to the parties, the entry
requirement in some respects ranks over the separate judgment
requirement. The process by which parties are given notice is set forth
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) which states that
[i]mmediately upon the entry of an order or judgment the clerk
shall serve a notice of the entry by mail in the manner provided
for in Rule 5 upon each party who is not in default for failure to
appear, and shall make a note in the docket of the mailing ....
[A]ny party may in addition serve a notice of such entry in the
manner provided in Rule 5 for the service of papers. Lack of
notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal
or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to
appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted in Rule 4(a)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.' 69
Thus, this rule appears to give the docket entry requirement primacy in
that it is the event that sets the clerk in motion. On the other hand, the
last sentence of the rule makes clear that the parties may not rely on the
clerk's obligation to give notice of the entry of an order or judgment-the
parties are still required to check the public records kept by the court, that
is, the docket sheet and the case record where the separate judgment
should be filed. Additionally, although Civil Procedure Rule 77(d) only
mentions the entry requirement, it implicitly involves the separate
document requirement since the clerks typically send a copy of the
document in question when giving notice of its entry. Thus, in many
ways the two requirements have a "belt and suspenders" relationship; they
are complementary parts of an integrated system of notice and
recordkeeping rather than totally independent elements.
However, there is one important function served by the docket entry
requirement, setting it apart from the separate document requirement,
which the Supreme Court failed to mention: it establishes a control date
168. Unfortunately, discrepancies between docket entries and the judgment
documents to which they refer are only part of the recordkeeping problem. It is often
the case that both the docket entry and the judgment document fail to clearly and
accurately state the court's disposition of the case. In this event, reference must be made

to the order or orders underlying the judgment document. This is yet another reason
why it is difficult to establish the relative importance of the docket entry and the
judgment document.

169. FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d).
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by which the timeliness of a great many pleadings is measured. 70 In the
absence of a docket entry, it may be difficult either to determine the
timeliness of those pleadings or to limit the amount of time an action
spends on the district court's active calendar.17 ' Even though the
Supreme Court stated in Mallis that "[t]he sole purpose of the separatedocument requirement ... was to clarify when the time for appeal under

28 U.S.C. § 2107 begins to run,"" it is clear that the primary tool for
determining the time to appeal is the docket entry, since both § 2107 and

Appellate Procedure Rule 4 specify entry as the starting point for the
the separate judgment document, which
timeliness calculation;"
precedes and leads to the entry on the docket, only clarifies which docket
entry starts the appellate clock. However, the importance of the entry

requirement as a mechanical docket control device also does not make it
a jurisdictional prerequisite. 74
One authority which appears to tie entry of judgment with the
jurisdictional finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b) which provides, in pertinent part,
170. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) & (c)(2) (motion for judgment as a matter of
law or for new trial to be made within ten days after entry of judgment); 52(b) (motion
to amend findings within ten days of entry of judgment); 54(d)(2)(B) (motion for
attorneys' fees within fourteen days after entry of judgment); 59(b) & (e) (motion for
new trial or to alter or amend judgment within ten days after entry of judgment); 60(b)
(certain motions for relief from judgment within one year after judgment, order or
proceeding was entered or taken); 62(a) (stay of judgment enforcement until expiration
of ten days after its entry); 74(a) (appeal from magistrate judge after entry ofjudgment);
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) & (b) (filing of notice of appeal after entry of judgment). The
district courts and courts of appeals may also have local rules which calculate deadlines
from the date of entry of an order or pleading. Since the date of mailing of an order or
judgment is also noted in the docket, FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d), the entry also provides the
control date for determining the timeliness of pleadings which must be filed within a
certain time period after service of the order or judgment. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
72(a) & (b) (objections to magistrate judge's order or report due within ten days of
service of order or report).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 5 F.3d 628, 631 n.2 (2d Cir. 1993)
(although request for reinstatement appeared to be untimely, court gave appellant "the
benefit of the doubt because the docket sheet d[id] not indicate the date the district court
entered the judgment denying § 2255 relief.").
172. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978).
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1994); FED. R. App. P. 4(a).
174. The use of the docket entry requirement to determine the timeliness of a notice
of appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and Appellate Procedure Rule 4, is not to be
equated to its use in determining the timeliness of other pleadings, since the timeliness
of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review. Appellate
Procedure Rule 4 is discussed separately in the text. See infra notes 182-190 and
accompanying text.
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[i]n the absence of such determination and direction [the district
court's Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) certification], any order or
other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.175
It can be inferred from the last clause of the quoted paragraph that a
decision is not final until final judgment is entered. If entry was not a
requirement of finality, the drafters of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) could
have simply stated that an interlocutory decision was rendered final only
upon adjudication of "all claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties."176 But they did not do so.
In the end, however, even this reference in Civil Procedure Rule
54(b) is not clear enough to justify making entry on the docket sheet an
element of finality. First, the advisory committee notes accompanying
Civil Procedure Rule 54 nowhere mention the entry requirement-they
simply reflect the drafters' wish to allow appeals from certain orders prior
to the time the entire case is adjudicated.'"1 Essentially, the notes
indicate that the advisory committee was concerned with actual finality
rather than the procedural device which simply signaled finality.
Moreover, although the reference in Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) to the
entry requirement suggests that entry may be an element of finality, it
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

176. Id.
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) advisory committee's note to 1946 amendment. The
advisory committee noted that "Rule 54(b) was originally adopted in view of the wide
scope and possible content of the newly created 'civil action' in order to avoid the
possible injustice of a delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim to await
adjudication of the entire case." Furthermore, to resolve the confusion caused when
judgment was entered on fewer than all claims, "the Advisory Committee ... attempted
to redefine the original rule with particular stress upon the interlocutory nature of partial
judgments which did not adjudicate all claims arising out of a single transaction or
occurrence." Id.; see also Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, Advisory Committee on Rules for
Civil Procedure, note to proposed amendment of Rule 54(b) at 65 (May 1944) (rebound
in 2 Legislative History of Rules of Civil Procedure, Amendments 1945/46) ("The

amended rule is designed to make clear that interim adjudications disposing of some, but
not all, of the claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims arising out of
a single transaction or occurrence are provisional. Judgment is not to be entered until
all of such claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims are determined.").
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does not directly mandate the entry of every judgment. 7 8 On the other
hand, the provision in Civil Procedure Rule 58, which does specifically
mandate entry of a judgment pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 79(a), does
not suggest that this requirement affects the finality of the judgment in
question. 179 The fact that the Civil Procedure Rule 58 docket entry
requirement parallels the separate document requirement, and does not
bear any resemblance or reference to Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) or the
finality requirement, further suggests that it too should be treated as a nonjurisdictional requirement.tm
An argument also can be made that Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4, and its statutory analog, 28 U.S.C. § 2107,181 reflect the
jurisdictional nature of the entry requirement. Appellate Procedure Rule
4 provides that the timeliness of notices of appeal, a jurisdictional
prerequisite to appellate review,"n is measured from the date of entry
of the order or judgment from which an appeal is taken."u The rule
clearly assumes entry will be made of all orders or judgments. The
strongest language relating to the entry requirement is in Appellate
Procedure Rule 4(a)(2), which states that "[a] notice of appeal filed after
the court announces a decision or order but before the entry of the
judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and after the
entry. " " This subsection appears to directly address the issue at hand:
what happens when a party files a notice of appeal from a judgment or
order but no entry of that judgment or order has yet been made?
However, rather than mandating entry in all cases, the subsection only
assumes that entry eventually will be made as a matter of course and
concentrates on saving the premature notice of appeal.
Thus, there is nothing in either Appellate Procedure Rule 4 or its
advisory committee notes directly connecting entry to the finality doctrine
178. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
180. The definition of "entry" in Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(7) is limited by its
own terms to the use of that word in Appellate Procedure Rule (4)(a). However, to the
extent that the Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(7) definition was intended in Civil
Procedure Rule 54(b), the separate judgment component of Appellate Procedure Rule

4(a) "entry" renders it non-jurisdictional.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988).

182. The timely filing of notices of appeal in both civil and criminal cases is
mandatory andjurisdictional. Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257,
264 (1978) (civil); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960) (criminal).
183. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)-(6), and (b).
184. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2).

NEW YORK L4W SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

or any other jurisdictional concept." In fact, Rule 4(a)(7) requires an
opposite conclusion, at least insofar as the word "entry" is used in
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a). As made clear by the text of Appellate
Procedure Rule 4(a)(7), the advisory committee notes and other

authorities, Appellate Procedure Rule 4 "entry" (as distinguished from
Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) "entry") refers to both Civil Procedure Rule
79(a) docketing and preparation of a separate judgment document.186
Since the separate document requirement is clearly nonjurisdictional under
Mallis, Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a) entry also must be nonjurisdictional
7

at least to the extent that it incorporates that requirement.'

185. The one appellate rule other than Appellate Procedure Rule 4 which does
discuss jurisdictional prerequisites does not appear to answer the issue at hand. Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a) states that "[flailure of an appellant to take any step
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal,
but is ground only for such action as the court of appeals deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal." FED. R. App. P. 3(a). Since the entry of judgment is
not a step the appellant is charged with taking, it is unlikely that this provision can be
construed, by negative inference or otherwise, as providing that entry is
nonjurisdictional. However, in discussing the original version of this provision, adopted
as part of FED. R. Civ. P. 73 in 1938, the chair of the Advisory Committee may have
suggested that nothing other than the timely filing of the notice of appeal should be
deemed a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal: "the appeal is taken by merely filing
with the clerk of the district court a notice of appeal. That is the only jurisdictional act,
and nothing else that has to be done is jurisdictional, and the failure to perform it
properly may result in a dismissal, or something of that kind, but cannot defeat the
appeal absolutely for want of jurisdiction." Proceedings of the [A.B.A.] Institute at
Washington, D.C. October 6, 7, 8, 1938, and of the Symposium at New York City
October 17, 18, 19, 1938 at 317 (A.B.A. 1938) (comments of William D. Mitchell, chair
of Advisory Committee); accordProceedings of the [A.B.A.] Institute on Federal Rules,
Cleveland, Ohio, July 21-23 1938 at 359 (A.B.A. 1938) (similar comments of William
D. Mitchell, chair of Advisory Committee); see also Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States,
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, note to proposed amendment of Rule
73(a) at 84 (May 1944) (rebound in 2 Legislative History of Rules of Civil Procedure,
Amendments 1945/46) (With regard to reducing the period of time in which to file a
notice of appeal, the advisory committee noted: "All that is necessary to take an appeal
under the rules is the filing of a notice of appeal. Ample time is allowed thereafter for
perfecting the appeal.").
186. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
187. The clumsiness of parsing the entry requirement of Appellate Procedure Rule
4 into jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional components also suggests that no such
distinction was intended.
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Additionally, the advisory committee note to the 1979 amendment of
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(6),11 which added the reference to Civil
Procedure Rule 58, also suggests that Civil Procedure Rule 79(a) entry is
not a jurisdictional prerequisite:
The proposed amendment would call attention to the requirement
of Rule 58 of the F.R.C.P. that the judgment constitute a separate
document. See United States v. Indrelunas,411 U.S. 216 (1973).
When a notice of appeal is filed, the clerk should ascertain
whether any judgment designated therein has been entered in
compliance with Rules 58 and 79(a) and if not, so advise all
parties and the district judge. While the requirement of Rule 48
[sic] is not jurisdictional, (see Bankers Trust Co. v. MaIlis, 431
U.S. 928 (1977)[sic]), compliance is important since the time for
the filing of a notice of appeal by other [sic] parties is measured
by the time at which the judgment is properly entered."8 9
The second sentence of the note states that the failure to enter judgment
requires merely that the parties and district judge be advised of the
omission. It does not require dismissal of the appeal or any other
interruption of the appellate process. While it can be assumed that the
court or parties usually will arrange for proper entry after being so
advised (which would then allow the notice of appeal to be treated as filed
on the entry date pursuant to Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2)), the note
does not require any particular result if a docket entry is never made,
either through oversight or refusal of the clerk to do so. 1"
As a final matter, it is clear that the policy considerations discussed
in Mallis apply equally to the docket entry requirement. As with the
188. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) (recodified in Supplement V to the 1988 version of
28 U.S.C. as FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)).

189. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) advisory committee note to 1979 Amendment. The
context makes clear that the reference in the last sentence to "Rule 48" should be to
"Rule 58." Additionally, the Mallis citation should be 435 U.S. 381 (1978); the citation
used in the Advisory Committee Note is to the grant of certiorari. Finally, the meaning

of the phrase "by other parties" in the last sentence is unclear since the time for filing
the first notice of appeal in an action is measured from the entry of judgment, Appellate

Procedure Rule 4(a)(1), and, if that notice is timely, "any other party may file a notice
of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time
otherwise prescribed by this [Appellate Procedure] Rule 4(a), whichever period last
expires," FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(3).
190. As noted earlier, district courts occasionally will refuse to enter a judgment

pursuant to Civil Procedure Rules 58 and 79(a). See supra notes 52 & 118 and text
accompanying note 118. As a consequence, it may be unfair to make a jurisdictional

prerequisite of a ministerial act over which the appellant has little or no control.

450
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separate document requirement, certainty as to timeliness or the other
functions of the docket entry are
not advanced by holding that appellate jurisdiction does not exist
absent a [docket entry corresponding to the order or judgment
under appeal]. If, by error, [the relevant docket entry is not
made] before a party appeals, nothing but delay would flow from
requiring the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal. Upon
dismissal, the district court would simply [make the requisite
docket entry], from which a timely appeal would then be taken.
Wheels would spin for no practical purpose. 9 '
Moreover, strict compliance with the docket entry requirement would still
not be determinative of whether the decision of the district court was
"final" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291:12 "[e]ven if a separate
judgment is filed [or the judgment is entered on the docket], the courts of
appeals must still determine whether the district court intended the
judgment to represent the final decision in the case. " "
3.

The Docket Entry Requirement Should Be Deemed Waivable, But
Only in Narrow Circumstances

Third, although it is concluded that the Civil Procedure Rule 79(a)
entry requirement should not be deemed jurisdictional, waiver of this
requirement should not be freely permitted. As previously noted, the
docket sheet is frequently used by the parties to the action, the general
public, and court officials to determine, inter alia, the status of individual
motions and the case itself, and deadlines for service or filing of various
pleadings." 9 It thus helps to keep all interested persons informed and
keeps the litigation moving forward to a timely disposition.
191. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 385 (1978).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
193. Mallis, 435 U.S. at 385-86 n.6. It appears that the Supreme Court overstated

the proposition when it noted that "strict compliance with the separate-judgment
requirement [would not] aid in the court of appeals' determination of whether the
decision of the District Court was 'final' for purposes of § 1291." Id. Both the separate
judgment document and the docket entry are often of some aid to the courts of appeals
when making the finality determination. While that determination will be based
primarily on the actual decision of the district court being appealed, the judgment
document and docket entry often offer additional clues as to whether the district court
intended an order to be the final decision.
194. See supranote 170 (listing rules which use docket entries to establish deadlines

for filing of pleadings) and accompanying text.
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Even where the parties agree to waive the docket entry requirement,
both the public and the court system have an interest in a docket which
accurately reflects the proceedings in an action. First, and perhaps most
important, accurate docket entries enable an appellate court to
expeditiously determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear an appeal.
Review of the docket sheet allows appellate court personnel to quickly
determine (a) whether the notice of appeal was filed within the time
constraints of Appellate Procedure Rule 4 and § 21071 and (b) whether
the appeal is from an appealable order or judgment. Just as the parties to
an appeal cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court
through consent or waiver,' 96 they should not be allowed to obstruct the
court's ability to make a jurisdictional determination by waiving the docket
entry requirement.
Moreover, an accurate docket prevents persons who were not involved
in the proceedings from drawing incorrect conclusions relating to either
the procedural history or the substantive disposition. For example, as
previously discussed, 191 the Seventh Circuit reached a decision on the
jurisdictional issue involved in Parisie v. Greer,9 ' based partly on a
description of the Mallis pleadings made by the Second Circuit and an
assumption that the Supreme Court likewise took that information into
account when it ruled in Mallis.' 9 A review of the district court docket
sheet from the Mallis action, however, clearly shows that the Second
Circuit's description of the pleadings was inaccurate, thus undermining the
Seventh Circuit's conclusion since the Supreme Court was more likely to
have relied on the information appearing in the docket rather than the
inaccurate information in the Second Circuit opinion.'
195. 29 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988).
196. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986);
American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951); United States v.

Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229 (1938); Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 18
(1930); International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 119 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); see also United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d

754, 768 (1st Cir. 1994) (cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on trial or appellate
court by indolence, oversight, acquiescence or consent).

197. See supra note 18.
198. 705 F.2d 882, 883, 890-91 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 950

(1983).
199. Id. at 891 n.3; see supra note 18.
200. Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's assumption in Parisie,the Supreme Court's
silence in Mallis on the timeliness issue more likely stemmed from the fact that there was
no such issue, as reflected in the district court docket sheet from the Mallis action, than
from a decision to deal with that unsettled issue sub silentio. See supranote 18.
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However, where the appellate court's jurisdiction is clear both in
terms of timeliness and finality, notwithstanding the absence of a proper
docket entry, and there does not appear to be any prejudice to any party,
the public or the court, waiver may be appropriate to avoid the
purposeless spinning of wheels."1
a. Timeliness of the Appeal Should Be Clear
Since timeliness of the notice of appeal is measured from the date of
entry of the order or judgment being appealed,' the absence of an entry
prevents a notice of appeal from being untimely, no matter how long the
appellant takes to file the notice of appeal after the order or judgment is
rendered. This is clear from both the language of Appellate Procedure
Rule 4(a)(1) concerning the timely filing of notices of appeal and
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2) which provides that a notice of appeal
filed prior to the entry of the decision or order appealed from will be
treated as filed "on the date of and after the entry. " '
However, in the case where an appellant waits an unreasonable
amount of time after the decision or order is either announced or rendered
in a document, it is conceivable that a court of appeals may deem the
absence of an entry insufficient excuse for the delay and dismiss the
appeal. While dismissal on grounds of delay may be appropriate under
the laches or other estoppel doctrine, it is assumed that only the rare
appeal will qualify for such treatment in light of the clear timing language
of Appellate Procedure Rule 4 and the need to demonstrate that prejudice
resulted from the delay before estoppel will be found warranted.'
201. The factors noted in the text which would justify a finding of waiver of the

docket entry requirement parallel those which were found to warrant a finding of waiver
of the separate document requirement in Mallis:
Here the District Court clearly evidenced its intent that the opinion and
order from which an appeal was taken would represent the final decision in the
case. A judgment of dismissal was recorded in the clerk's docket. And
petitioner did not object to the taking of the appeal in the absence of a separate
judgment.

Mallis, 435 U.S. at 387-88.
202. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
203. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(2).
204. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961) (laches requires (a)
lack of diligence by party against whom it is asserted and (b) prejudice to party asserting
defense); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 323 (1936) ("Estoppel
in equity must rest on substantial grounds of prejudice or change of position, not
technicalities."); Martin v. Consultants & Adm'rs, Inc., 966 F.2d 1078, 1091 (7th Cir.
1992) (laches is a species of estoppel and requires (a) unreasonable delay and (b) harm
or prejudice). Cf Fiore v. Washington County Community Mental Health Ctr., 960
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b. Finality of the Judgment or Order Should Be Clear
The finality of the judgment or order under appeal must be determined
independently of, and prior to, the determination of whether there has
been a waiver of the docket entry requirement. As noted in Mallis, the
district court must "clearly evidence[] its intent that the opinion and order
from which an appeal was taken ... represent[s] the final decision in the
case."205 Moreover, regardless of the district court's intentions, the
order or judgment under appeal must, in fact, be final. Where waiver of
the separate document requirement might require entry of the judgment in
the docket to evidence the finality of the decision appealed from,'

waiver of the docket entry requirement might require, conversely, a
separate judgment document or other clear indication that the order
appealed from is the final decision in the case. Other indications might
include language in the order or decision itself (or in the transcript

evidencing the rendering of an oral order or decision), notations in the
docket indicating that the case is closed or otherwise suggesting finality,

F.2d 229, 236 (1st Cir. 1992) (en banc) (appeals filed more than three months after last
district court decision should be dismissed, notwithstanding absence of separatejudgment;
discussed at supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text). It is unclear whether the Fiore
court was relying on estoppel principles in establishing its three-month rule. The
strongest indication that estoppel was not the underlying rationale was the determination
that the three-month limitation would apply in all cases absent exceptional circumstances,
thus implying that prejudice was not a prerequisite. Fiore, 960 F.2d at 236. Although
the prejudice determination has traditionally focused on possible prejudice to a litigant,
it is possible that the Fiore court deemed controlling the prejudice to the court in having
its interest in the timely disposition of cases circumvented. However, the courts' interest
in avoiding delay, by itself, is unlikely to satisfy the prejudice element of the laches or
estoppel doctrines. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v. Scimed Life Sys., 988 F.2d
1157, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Although the principles of equity ignore no form of
prejudice, the prejudice element of laches is not established solely because the raising of
the claim would delay other litigation. Justice requires that an issue in legitimate dispute
not be held forfeited ... merely because it would complicate other pending litigation.");
see also National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 710
(5th Cir. 1994) ("To support a determination of laches, there must be more than simply
an inexcusable delay; the party asserting laches must also establish that it has been
prejudiced by the delay . . ."). Moreover, the courts' interest in avoiding delay will
often, if not always, be counterbalanced by its interest in disposing of claims on their
merits. See Jung v. K. & D. Mining Co., 356 U.S. 335, 337 (1958) (discussed at supra
notes 77-83 and accompanying text).
205. Mallis, 435 U.S. at 387.
206. See id. at 387-88 (noting the recording of the judgment of dismissal in the
clerk's docket as one of the circumstances permitting the finding that the separate
judgment requirement was waived).
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or oral or written notification from the district court confirming that the
order or decision is final.
c. Prejudice and Waiver
The possible prejudice that might result from the absence of a docket
entry has already been discussed.'
In regard to waiver by the parties
of the entry requirement, it may be established, as with waiver of the
separate document requirement, either by affirmative waiver or by the
taking of an appeal by one party without any other party objecting on that
ground." s However, waiver by the parties should not end the court's
inquiry. The court should also consider the possibility of prejudice to the
public or the court itself as a result of the absence of a docket entry before
accepting the parties' waiver.
It should further be noted that the presence of prejudice should not
automatically result in a stay or dismissal of the appeal. In fact, a stay or
dismissal of the appeal, for the sole purpose of allowing the district court
to make the requisite entry, is likely to be unnecessary in most
circumstances. When the absence of an entry is brought to the attention
of either the district court or the court of appeals, and it is clear that the
omission does not bring the appellate court's jurisdiction into question,
either court may order the docket sheet corrected under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 10(e) without interrupting the processing or
scheduling of the appeal itself.'
In effect, the omission of a docket
entry where prejudice may result from that omission should be treated in
the same manner as the absence of a separate judgment document where
such absence renders the timeliness of the appeal uncertain.2"' When
207. See supra notes 171, 194-200 and accompanying text.

208. See Mallis, 435 U.S. at 387-88; see, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.,
9 F.3d 259, 263 n.1 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994); Cooper v.
Salomon Bros., 1 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 737 (1994); Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven, 889 F.2d 428, 430-31 (2d Cir. 1989).
209. See supra note 114, for text of Appellate Procedure Rule 10(e).
210. Thus, as was concluded with regard to the separate judgment requirement,
when it comes to the attention of the appellate court that a district court docket entry is
necessary, the appellate process is better served by the appellate court itself ordering the
district court to either make the entry or explain its absence rather than require the
appellant to make the request on her own. See supra note 105 (requiring appellant to
return to district court would cause unnecessary delay and may frustrate appellate review;
burden of failure to enter separate judgment should fall on party seeking to assert
untimeliness defense) and accompanying text.

1996]

APPELLATE JURISDICTION REQUIREMENTS

calling such a docket entry omission to the attention of a district court, the
court of appeals should require the district court to correct the omission
or explain why correction is unnecessary or inappropriate. 1

211. The author offers the following example of language that may be used in a
court of appeals order where it appears that a necessary docket entry was erroneously
omitted by the district court:
It appears from the district court docket sheet and other materials available to
this court that the judgment [or order] under appeal [describe document] was
executed on [date] but that no corresponding docket entry meeting the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 79(a) was made. The district court is hereby
directed to either make the appropriate docket entry or submit an explanation
of why such docket entry is not required, within ten days of the date of this
order.

